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Abstract: Motivated by the recent antitrust investigations concerning the Google-Android 
case, this dissertation develops a theoretical model of bundling with compatibility costs based 
on the model of Cornière and Taylor (2018) adapted to Google’s tying practices in 
smartphone pre-installed applications. Our model incorporates the specificities of the alleged 
efficiencies that Google claims to have when its applications are installed together and 
demonstrates the incompatibilities that rival’s apps have when they are pre-installed. This 
dissertation aims to examine how the anticompetitive effects and the optimal decision of 
tying or pure bundling are affected by the introduction of synergies and compatibility costs. 
The results demonstrate that bundling produces the same anticompetitive effect regardless 
of the synergies that the monopolist has when its components are installed together, and the 
synergy does not rely solely on bundling in order to be realized. However, the synergy makes 
bundling a more optimal strategy, since the downstream firm bears the compatibility cost 
and rivals have more difficulties to install their components. Furthermore, we modified the 
sequence of negotiations and obtain the same results as in the original model: bundling 
continues to be strictly necessary to capture the global value of the tying component and 
reduces rival’s willingness of paying slotting fees, regardless if its rival decide secondly its 
slotting fee. This dissertation attempts to provide additional insights on existing conflicts 
about EU competition policy action regarding tying practices and provide additional 
information on the determinants of the optimality of tying and its consequences to 
competition. 
 
JEL codes: L1, L4. 
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Resumo: Motivada pelas recentes investigações levadas a cabo pela Comissão Europeia 
sobre o caso Google-Android, esta dissertação desenvolve um modelo teórico baseado no 
modelo de Cornière e Taylor (2018) adaptado à prática de tying por parte da Google em 
aplicações pré-instaladas em dispositivos móveis. O nosso modelo incorpora as 
especificidades das eficiências que a Google afirma ter quando as suas aplicações são pré-
instaladas em bundle e as incompatibilidades que seus concorrentes têm quando suas 
aplicações são pré-instaladas. Esta dissertação procura analisar como os efeitos 
anticompetitivos e a decisão ótima de tying ou “bundling puro” são afetados pela introdução de 
sinergias e custos de compatibilidade. Os resultados mostram que o bundling produz o mesmo 
efeito anticompetitivo independentemente das sinergias que o monopolista possa ter quando 
os seus componentes são instalados em bundle. Cumulativamente, a sinergia não depende 
apenas do bundling para ser realizada. No entanto, no nosso modelo esta prática apresenta-se 
como uma estratégia ainda mais ótima, pois o custo de compatibilidade é suportado pela 
empresa a jusante e a empresa rival apresenta maiores dificuldades em instalar o seu 
componente. Ademais, modificamos a sequência das negociações e obtivemos os mesmos 
resultados que o modelo original: o bundling continua a ser estritamente necessário para 
capturar o valor global do componente 𝐴 e reduz o incentivo da empresa concorrente em 
oferecer slotting fees, independentemente de a última decidir em segundo lugar. Esperamos 
que nosso modelo providencie novas perspetivas sobre os possíveis métodos de análise por 
parte da política da concorrência em relação ao tying e forneça informações adicionais sobre 
os seus determinantes e consequências para a concorrência. 
 
JEL codes: L1, L4. 
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1. Introduction 
In July 2018, the European Commission fined Google with 4.34 billion euros for 
violating EU antitrust rules. According to the EC1, “since 2011, Google has imposed illegal 
restrictions on Android device manufacturers and mobile network operators to cement its 
dominant position in general internet search.” In other words, the firm was accused of 
abusing its market dominance on the Android operating system to perform illegal tying of 
applications such as Google Chrome and Search. Furthermore, the firm also abused its 
market dominance of the Search application and Google Play to impede the distribution of 
different operating systems based on Android open-source code. 
In resemblance to other corporate strategies attractive to consumers, tying practices are 
increasingly more common, particularly in two-sided and digital markets (Holzweber, 2018). 
Antitrust efforts were mainly directed on the harms caused to consumers due to raising 
prices, but the majority of products offered by Google are free for the final consumer. 
Therefore, antitrust regulators have been hesitant to measure the real consequences and the 
intents of these practices2.  
Google services are increasingly present in our everyday lives. In a worldwide scale, 3 in 
4 people with a handset device use the Android operating system3. According to Google’s 
Economic Impact Report of 2018, Google Search and Advertising tools generated $335 
billion U.S. dollars in economic activity in the U.S.A. Furthermore, in the most recently 
reported fiscal year, Google's revenue reached €122.1 billion and ranked first among 
worldwide internet companies, with a market capitalization of €457 billion4. Therefore, the 
study of anticompetitive effects from Google’s tying practices reveals an issue of great 
economic relevance. Likewise to the Microsoft-Internet Explorer case, the resolution of the 
Google-Android case may set precedents to future competition policy measures regarding 
large technology firms which have significant role in our everyday lives.  
                                                     
1 European Commission - Press release “Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices 
regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google's search engine” Released on 18 July 
2018. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm. 
2 Antitrust policy in multi-sided markets faces additional challenges because practices that are harmful to 
consumers in one-sided markets can benefit consumers in multi-sided markets, and vice-versa. See Correia-da-
Silva, Jullien, Lefouili, and Pinho (2019) and the references therein. 
3 Mobile Operating System Market Share. Retrieved from: http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-
share/mobile/worldwide. 
4 Google's revenue worldwide from 2002 to 2018 (in billion U.S. dollars). Retrieved from: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266206/googles-annual-global-revenue/. 
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Although tying differs from the concept of bundling (Adams & Yellen, 1976), the term 
bundling is used in our model as a general term for “pure bundling”, which represents the 
same economic concept and effects of tying (Holzweber, 2018; Kühn, Stillman, & Caffarra, 
2005). Tying or “pure bundling” may be described as the act of selling a product or a service 
with a binding clause for the purchase of a different service or product (Tirole, 2005) in a 
way that the vendor threatens not to sell a good unless the another good is also sold (Carlton 
& Waldman, 2012). 
The aim of this dissertation and its contribution to the literature consists in the 
modification of the baseline model of Cornière and Taylor (2018) in order to investigate, 
through the lens of Industrial Organization, how the optimal decision of tying is altered if 
synergies and compatibility costs are present and what are its anticompetitive effects in 
comparison to the original model. The inclusion of synergies and compatibility costs has the 
objective of approximating the baseline model to the specificities of Google’s allegations5 on 
the appeal of the Commission accusation. Additionally, a brief overview of the European 
Competition Law is provided in order to understand what are the infringements and the legal 
framework of Google’s tying practices. 
The model of Cornière and Taylor (2018) presents a multiproduct upstream bundling 
structured as the following: A downstream company (𝐷) sells a finished good made from 
components obtained from upstream suppliers to final consumers at price 𝑝. The 
components are divided into two categories, 𝐴 and 𝐵. For component 𝐴, firm 𝑈1 is the sole 
producer. For component 𝐵, 𝑈1 and 𝑈2 firms compete to sell their own type (𝐵1 and 𝐵2, 
respectively). Firm 𝐷 can only install one version of component 𝐵.  
In addition to the extension of the Cornière and Taylor (2018) model, I also modify the 
sequence of the negotiations in order to verify if the same results hold. Specifically, if 
bundling continues to be strictly necessary in order to capture the global value of component 
𝐴, if it reduces rival’s willingness of paying slotting fees and lastly, how the feature of the 
upstream rival firm deciding secondly affects the optimal decision of bunding. 
The results reveal that bundling produces the same anticompetitive effect regardless the 
synergies that firm 𝑈1 has when its components are installed together, and the synergy does 
                                                     
5  See “Android has created more choice, not less”. Published Jul 18, 2018. Available at 
https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/android-has-created-more-choice-not-less/. 
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not rely solely on bundling in order to be realized. Moreover, bundling is even a more optimal 
strategy in our model, since the downstream firm bears the compatibility cost and 𝑈2 has 
increased difficulties to outbid 𝑈1’s slotting fee. Regarding the timing modification, the 
results obtained are the same as the original model: bundling continues to be strictly 
necessary to capture the increase of slotting-fees and sales, caused by component 𝐴 
installation and reduces rival’s willingness of paying slotting fees, independently from if 𝑈2 
decide secondly its slotting fee. 
The dissertation has the following structure: The first Chapter is dedicated to the 
introduction. In Chapter 2, the general framework of the European Competition Law and 
its approach to tying practices are explained. Chapter 3 proceeds to the literature review of 
tying. It presents the seminal work in the field and identifies its motives, methods and effects. 
Thereby providing the foundations of the dissertation. In Chapter 4, the pertinent features 
of Google-Android case are presented and substantiated by different points of view from 
the recent related literature. Chapter 5 presents the modified sequence of the negotiations 
from the baseline model of Cornière and Taylor (2018). Then, it proceeds to the model with 
compatibility costs coupled with the results of such modification. In Chapter 6, the results 
are discussed and compared to the original model and other models from the literature of 
tying. In the last Chapter, the main conclusions and limitations of our research are presented.   
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2. EU Competition Law 
The European Competition Law regulates and prevents any anticompetitive conduct by 
undertakings6 to ensure the maintenance of competition within the European Single Market. 
Specifically, it prevents the occurrence of any anticompetitive agreements such as: abuse of 
dominant market position, cartels, invalid mergers and acquisitions, or biased State 
intervention (Chappatte & Boyce, 2018). According to the Directorate General for 
Competition, competition enhances innovation and efficiency. As consequence, goods and 
services are offered at the most favourable terms for consumers. Nonetheless, in order to be 
effective, competition requires independent firm’s decision-making coupled with 
competitive intention. 
Currently, the European antitrust law is based on the Articles 101 to Article 109 of the 
TFEU and some European Directives and Regulations. However, its backbone consists of 
two central rules set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Articles 
101 and 102. The first article averts any anticompetitive practice that could disrupt free 
competition and Article 102 prevents any abuse of dominant market position (European 
Commission, 2012). Therefore, Article 102 presents as the second key provision after Article 
101. Lastly, the European Commission has adopted various non-regulatory documents such 
as guidelines, notices, handbooks, et cetera. which have the purpose to explain more deeply 
the actions of the Commission on procedural issues or antitrust rules’ interpretations. 
The Treaty has the force of law over the European Economic Area (EEA) to secure the 
Single Internal Market and ensure the free movement of goods and services throughout the 
European Union. Generally, the TFEU is imposed by the European Commission but, in 
certain circumstances, it can be imposed by the Member States’ National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs). The two entities enforce together the EU antitrust rules in the 
framework of the European Competition Network (ECN). Since 2004, the Commission and 
NCAs have investigated a wide range of cases and adopted over one thousand decisions. 
Since then until 2014, over 85% of antitrust rules’ decisions were applied by NCAs.7 The 
National Competition Authorities are fully empowered to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the 
                                                     
6 In EU antitrust law, an undertaking is any entity with an economic activity regardless of its legal status and 
the form in which it is financed. No intention of profits is required, nor are public entities excluded (European 
Commission, 2005). 
7 European Commission - Press release “Antitrust: Commission proposal to make national competition 
authorities even more effective enforcers for the benefit of jobs and growth”. Released on 22 March 2017. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-685_en.htm. 
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Treaty and may also apply provisions to protect the individual rights conferred to European 
citizens by the Treaty. 
The Commission's investigative authority to enforce Articles 101 and 102 is described in 
the Antitrust Regulation 1/20038. The Commission has also the capability to impose fines 
aimed at “punishment and deterrence”. The fines regard the duration and gravity of the 
infringement and are calculated under the framework of EC’s guidelines9. The respective 
undertakings have the right to appeal to the EU General Court, in order to annul or emend 
the Commission’s decision. Subsequently, the General Court can reduce, increase or cancel 
the fine imposed by the European Commission. 
 
2.1. Article 101 TFEU (ex-Article 81 TEC) 
Article 101 forbids any agreement between two or more independent undertakings which 
restrict or distort competition and transactions between Member States. This provision has 
the purpose of preventing any anticompetitive practice involving agreements between actual 
or potential competitors operating at the same level of the supply chain (horizontal 
agreements) and agreements between undertakings which operate at a different level of the 
production or distribution chain (vertical agreements) (European Commission, 2013a). This 
article applies to oral agreements, non-binding arrangements and understandings, express 
written contracts and other types of informal collusion. 
The focus of the Article 101 relies on the undertaking’s anticompetitive practices such 
as: directly or indirectly price-fixing; limit or control of the markets, investments, technical 
development or production; implementation of contracts with unequal conditions to 
equivalent transactions and contracts, which detriments competition; market or source of 
supply cartels; supplementary obligations with no connection with the subject of the 
contract. A noteworthy example of the infringement of Article 81 TEC was the €74 million 
fine on Sony, Fuji and Maxell in 2007 for fixing prices for professional videotapes sold to 
customers in Europe.10 
                                                     
8 See “Antitrust Regulations”. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/regulation 
s.html. 
9 See “Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/2003”. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52006XC0901(01) 
10 For further information about the case, see “Antitrust: Commission fines professional videotape producers 
over €74 million for price fixing cartel”. Available at: europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1725_en.pdf. 
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The Commission applies Article 101 on concerted practices which have no effects on 
the market but reveal anticompetitive intention. And the same applies when the agreement 
or practice has no anticompetitive intention but causes anticompetitive effects. Still, the 
effect must be substantial. Article 101(2) considers any undertaking found in breach of 
Article 101 TFEU to be null and void. Therefore, the previous agreements cannot be legally 
enforced. 
 
2.1.1. Exemptions to Article 101 TFEU (Article 101 (3)) 
The third paragraph of Article 101 empowers the Commission to make some narrow 
exceptions applied to individual agreements. It provides a degree of flexibility in vertical 
agreements or other concerted practices if the beneficial effects outweigh the anticompetitive 
impact.  
An agreement or practice is exempt from Article 101(1) if it contributes to the following 
four cumulative conditions: improves production and distribution of goods, or technical or 
economic progress, allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and cannot:  
• Article 101(3a) – “Impose any restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of those objectives.” 
• Article 101(3b) – “Give the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating 
competition for a substantial part of the products in question.” 
Additionally, the exemption can also be applied through block exemption regulations 
which are divided into three main categories11 (vertical agreements, horizontal cooperation 
agreements, and licensing agreements for technology transfer). The first, since certain 
contracts can improve economic efficiency within a chain of production or distribution by 
facilitating better coordination between the undertakings, the Commission established a 
group of block exemptions with the acceptable and prohibited contract terms (hardcore 
restrictions) for diverse types of vertical agreements12.  
                                                     
11 See Exempted agreements Article 101(3) TFEU. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ 
legislation/art101_3_en.html. 
12 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
TFEU to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. 
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As the second category, the European Commission exempts “Agreements of minor 
importance”13 from Article 101(1) (except agreements with fixing sale prices). This 
exemption is applied to companies which together represent less than 10% of the pertinent 
market in the case of horizontal arrangements, and 15% each in case of vertical agreements. 
This exemption is known as the “De minimis notice”. 
 As the last and third block exemption, the Article 101(3) allows anticompetitive practices 
if they are beneficial to consumers, by facilitating technological efficiencies or lower prices 
without restricting all competition in the concerned industry. 
Only a small number of official exemptions were given by the European Commission. 
A real-world example of an implemented exemption of the Article was the CEPSA case14, 
where the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints recognized that “resale price 
maintenance” could benefit consumers, prevent free-riding and encourage new entry.15 
 
2.2. Article 102 TFEU (ex-Article 82 TEC) 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly Article 
82 of the TEC) has the objective of preventing undertakings who hold a leading position in 
a given market from abusing its position of dominance. Few companies hold the sufficient 
market power to be investigated under Article 102. Nevertheless, a company could enjoy a 
significant market power and have low dominance in a specific geographic market or product 
market. The boundaries of geographic and product markets may be blur in certain cases, but 
the EC must define them precisely to assess dominance. 
According to the European Commission (2005), a dominant position can be described 
as a circumstance where the economic power held by a company could endanger the 
maintenance of its competitors, customers and consumers. Moreover, the Commission states 
that an undertaking with high market share and for a long period of time is more likely to be 
a preliminary indication of dominance. Generally, a company is unlikely to be dominant if it 
has a market share of less than 40%. Although, some companies can become under scrutiny 
even if they have low market power. Having a dominant position in the market is not itself 
                                                     
13 European Commission, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance which do not Appreciably Restrict 
Competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, OJ C 368, 22.12.2001, p.13-15. 
14 Case C-279/06 CEPSA Estaciones de Servicio SA [2008] ECR I-6681. 
15 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010/C. 
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a violation of the EU competition law but dominant undertakings have a special 
responsibility to behave in a way that does not harm competition. 
Objectively, the Article prohibits the following practices by dominant undertakings: 
Predatory Pricing (pricing at unfairly low levels with evidence of intention to exclude a 
competitor); Excessive Pricing (non-justifiable high level of price in order to difficult relevant 
transactions); Fidelity Rebates (discounts with the intention to exclude more inefficient 
competitors from the market); Refusal to Supply (refusal to sell to a certain customer); Tying 
(contracts subject to complementary purchase obligations); Discrimination (dissimilar 
transaction terms that may be considered abusing with no objective reason). 
Some notable examples of Article 102’s infringements include Google’s abuse of its 
market dominance in search engine by giving an illegal advantage to its shopping comparison 
service, resulting in a fine of €2.42 billion [Decision 2019/417]. The €1.06 billion fine 
imposed on Intel in 2009 for engaging in illegal exclusionary practices on the market for a 
x86 central processing units (CPUs). Lastly, the case of Deutsche Post AG concerning the 
market for business parcel services for attempting to eliminate competition by predatory 
pricing [Decision 2001/354]. 
 
2.3. European Commission on Tying 
In the assessment of tying practices as possible abuse, the European Directorate General 
for Competition verifies if the contracts and its effects correspond to Article 102(d). 
Although, since the practice includes an agreement between undertakings, tying and bundling 
also fall within the ambit of Article 101(e) (Holzweber, 2018). Conferring to both Articles, it 
is considered abusive “the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts”. Henceforward, the Commission 
considers that anticompetitive tying occurs when the subsequent four elements are present16: 
(i) the tying and the tied goods are distinct products; (ii) the firm is dominant in the tying 
market; (iii) the tying practice is not justified objectively nor produce efficiencies; (iv) the 
tying practice is likely to have a market distorting foreclosure effect. 
                                                     
16 Commission Decision, 53/07, 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23, 26 (EC). 
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(i) Fundamentally, two products are considered distinct if the demand indicates it. 
If the demand for one product decreases when the other is increased and vice-
versa, it reveals substitutability between goods. Thus, when the demand for both 
products is dependent on each other, it reveals strong evidence of products 
belonging to the same market (Holzweber, 2018). However, in order to 
foreclosure, tying must involve two different markets. If the two products belong 
to the same market, the only possible anticompetitive practice is predatory 
pricing or rebates (Holzweber, 2018). An indirect evidence of belonging to 
different markets is when, in competitive markets, firms with reduced market 
power tend not to bundle the products, because attends better customer’s 
demand by selling them separately (European Commission, 2005).. 
(ii) This aspect does not necessarily imply that the company is also dominant in the 
tied market. Nevertheless, as established in Article 102, if the firm is dominant in 
both markets for an extended period of time, the ground of abuse of market 
dominance is more probable. 
(iii) Tying may be considered abusive when the sale of separate products could be 
obtained with same or better conditions than the bundle. In other words, if the 
restrictions imposed by the tying practice are dispensable for the achievement of 
the objective (Article 101(3a)).  
Although, according to Article 101(3) this could be justified and tolerated if generate 
efficiencies in production, distribution or transaction. In some cases, contractual tying might 
be even necessary to achieve efficiencies when they are not apparent. This is a common 
feature of products that are technically integrated in a way that is difficult for supplying one 
without supplying another (e.g. cars with tires or shoes with shoelaces), but in such cases, the 
combination of two or more separated products should be considered as one product. 
Additionally, it is not a dominant firm’s responsibility to decide which products are inferior 
or not through contractual tying. And, if the practice excludes a significant part of the 
competition, all the benefits and efficiencies arising from practice are disregarded (Article 
101(3b)).  
(iv) The more common anticompetitive effect of tying is foreclosure of the tied 
market and, in a general way, the EC assessment of foreclosure consists of two 
parts (European Commission, 2011): a) determine which customers are “tied” 
10 
 
(id est, which rival’s costumers are lost to the dominant company); b) and specify 
whether these “tied” customers constitute a relevant market share. 
The identity of the tied customers reveals to be central in the assessment of the 
foreclosure effect (Graf, 2004). The tie could have a specific foreclosure effect if the tied 
customers are specifically important from an entry-deterring point of view (European 
Commission, 2005). Fundamentally, the foreclosure effect is as higher as the dimension of 
the “tied sales” on the tied market and it is also greater in the presence of significant network 
effects, learning curve or scale economies in the second market (Tirole, 2005). However, with 
product differentiation, the foreclosure effect may be reduced, since rival firms are more 
likely to remain in the market due to the customer’s loyalty and preferences (European 
Commission, 2005). 
Two of the most distinguished decisions from the European Commission concerning to 
tying practices was in 2004, when Microsoft infringed the Article 102 of the TFEU by tying 
Windows OS with Windows Media Player.17 And in 2008, when it bundled its operating 
system with its internet browser. The Commission argued that Microsoft leveraged its 
dominant position on the PC operating system market for anticompetitive motives either on 
the WMP and Internet Explorer programs. Another example was the Tetra Pak II in 1991 
case where the company tied the sales of Tetra Pak equipment to use Tetra Pak cartons on 
Tetra Pak machines18.  
  
                                                     
17 Commission Decision, 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. 
18 Tetra Pak International SA v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951. Case T-83/91 [1994] ECLI:EU:T:1994:246. 
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3. Literature on tying  
In this chapter, the literature review on the concept of tying is provided. The literature 
on the subject offers vast and different economic explanations, which could be 
complementary to each other. In a general way, firm’s motivation for tying two or more 
products may come from one of the following reasons: i) leveraging its market dominance 
into the tied market; ii) achieving better price discrimination; iii) realize efficiencies or 
complementarity between components; iv) deterring entry. 
However, due to the wide-ranging assumptions and market structures that different 
authors use on their models, the motivations for tying may differ slightly from the ones 
previously mentioned. In the following subsections, it is addressed these diverse 
characteristics, currents of thought, forms of implementation and effects on competition, 
innovation and consumers. 
3.1. Definition of tying 
Tying, or pure bundling, may be described by the act of selling a product or a service 
with a binding clause for the purchase of a different service or product in a way that the 
vendor threatens not to sell a good (tying good) unless another good (tied good) is also sold 
(Tirole, 2005). The best candidate for a tied good is frequently a complementary product 
(Amelio & Jullien, 2012; Nalebuff, 2004). 
Citing Whinston (1990, p. 839), this practice “provides a mechanism whereby a firm with 
monopoly power in one market can use the leverage provided to foreclose sales and 
monopolize a second market”. As result, it alters the price equilibrium, shift profits from the 
tied good to the monopolist of the tying good (Carlton, Gans, & Waldman, 2010) and make 
the tying product more valuable (Amelio & Jullien, 2012; Gans, 2011). Furthermore, tying 
also circumvents the non-negative price constraint in the tied product, and according to 
Carbajo, Demeza, and Seidmann (1990), segment the market and relaxes price competition.  
Since the sale of one product increases the sales of another unrelated product, thereby 
asphyxiating competition in the second market, tying constitutes as an anticompetitive 
practice. Whinston (1990) describes it as "strategic foreclosure". In addition, such practice 
blocks entry of potential competitors which cannot reach minimum viable scale economies 
(Carlton & Waldman, 2002; Ide & Montero, 2016; Whinston, 1990) and, if credible, 
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discourages investment and innovation (J. P. Choi & Stefanadis, 2001). As result, harming 
the competition in the tied market in the long run. 
It is important to emphasize that the tying concept differs from the concept of bundling, 
which is a common and legal method of price discrimination. Bundling is the joint act of 
selling two or more goods, at a discount or as complement in order to guarantee a continuous 
flow of sales of the complementary good (Adams & Yellen, 1976). In the practice of 
bundling, the two goods in question are related or complementary19 and there is the option 
of buying separately (mixed bundling). Tying (pure bundling) means that the products are 
available only as a bundle (Tirole, 2005). The distinction between tying and pure bundling is 
inconsequential if the tied product is valueless without the tying good (Tirole, 2005). The 
term pure bundling is more often used in economic literature and the term tying is more 
frequent in the antitrust literature (Kühn et al., 2005). Therefore, when the terms bundle and 
tying are used in this dissertation, both refer to the concept of pure bundling. 
3.2. The “Chicago School” argument 
Concerning the leverage theory of tying, the “Chicago School of Economics” (Bowers, 
1980; Bowman, 1957; Director & Levi, 1956; Posner, 1976) with neoclassical price theory, 
proclaimed that a monopolist firm cannot transfer its market power to another market and 
become “double” monopolist. This principle is known as the “one monopoly profit 
theorem” (Carlton & Waldman, 2014). The “Chicago School” explained that when the 
monopolist bundle two products and they are complementary to each other, there is only 
one final product. Thus, only one monopoly profit to be exploited. Furthermore, the authors 
claim that makes no economic sense to enter into the tied market if the last is perfectly 
competitive (i.e. prices are equal to the marginal cost), because customers will only buy the 
bundle if the increase of the tied product price equals to the valorisation of the tying product 
by consumers (Holzweber, 2018). Although, in such pricing, the consumers who buy the 
bundle are the same who buy the tying good alone, thus there is no profit increase (Nalebuff, 
2004).  
The Chicago School state that tying practices exists with the objective of achieving better 
price discrimination, protecting goodwill, achieving economies of scale, risk-sharing and 
                                                     
19 Although, the concept of product distinction is vague and calls up some complex issues. In legal cases, two 
products are deemed unrelated if, in the absence of tying or bundling, consumers would purchase the products 
separately (Tirole, 2005). 
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evade price regulation (R. Bork, 1978). Therefore tying is never anticompetitive and should 
not be considered as an antitrust violation, because none of these motivations harm 
competition (R. Bork, 1978). Although, since the Chicago School’s arguments are founded 
on a number of highly restrictive theoretical assumptions (for instance, perfectly competitive 
markets with perfectly informed consumers) the recent economic literature, such as 
Whinston (1990), J. P. Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Carlton and Waldman (2002) and Farrell 
and Katz (2000) resurged the legitimacy of the “leverage theory”. Furthermore, the Chicago 
School’s laissez-faire approach and its assumptions on tying is less applicable in the digital 
markets (Gans, 2011; Holzweber, 2018). In the latter markets, marginal revenue is 
considerably higher than (null) marginal costs and most digital goods are non-rivalrous and 
have network-effects (Holzweber, 2018). 
3.3. Forms of tying 
The most common form of tying is through contractual methods. However, vendors 
could also use technical or technological arrangements by making the tied and tying product 
integrated in a way that they become physically impossible to separate (J. P. Choi & 
Stefanadis, 2001; Geradin & Edelman, 2016; Gilbert & Riordan, 2007; Whinston, 1990). 
There are some real-world examples of technical bundling: cars with motors and seats, shoes 
are sold in pairs, etc. An obvious reason is that firms can integrate their products better than 
their customers. However, such simple examples are not relevant to competition policy. In 
fact, the focus of antitrust regulators is technical arrangements which have the purpose of 
producing anticompetitive or entry-deterring effects. For example, the IBM case20, where 
IBM required its consumers to buy its punch cards for its tabulating machines in order to 
function correctly. 
The use of contractual tying, similarly to Google’s contracts with smartphone 
manufacturers, can increase the credibility of tying (Carbajo et al., 1990). The literature 
differentiates contractual tying from technical tying, as the first can be untied afterward with 
a moderately low cost while the latter only with a substantial cost. Hence, technical tying 
could be used to pre-commit to tying when contractual tying is not credible (Whinston, 
1990). Carlton and Waldman (2002) consider another possibility of tying, a virtual tying 
                                                     
20 International Business Machines Corporation v. United States (298 U.S. 131 [1936]). 
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through pricing, where the monopolist set a high price for the primary product and a near 
zero price for the complementary good. Although, it is a low credible strategy.  
Regarding the credibility of tying,  Nalebuff (2004) states that tying is credible without 
needing any commitment because even if it fails to deter rival’s entry, the monopoly profit 
loss is mitigated. Thus, tying is an optimal option in both scenarios. 
3.4. Incentives and Effects  
The majority of the literature on tying is based on either price discrimination21, market 
foreclosure or efficiency rationales (Carlton et al., 2010; Dana & Spier, 2015; Nalebuff, 2004). 
Carlton et al. (2010) identify as the first potential driver for tying, the incapability for a 
monopoly to charge a small price for a good when it must firstly supply its indispensable 
complement. And, as the second, when consumers of the complementary product face 
compatibility costs. For example, Windows Media Player is already embedded in Windows 
operative system, this eliminates compatibility and installation costs for consumers. Without 
tying, consumers decrease their value for the product because those costs are carried by them 
(Amelio & Jullien, 2012; Carlton et al., 2010; Gans, 2011).  
Amelio and Jullien (2012) corroborate this argument in the two-sided markets, describing 
that tying could boost efficiency by improving coordination between related products, create 
more demand in the tied product and as consequence, increasing its membership value. 
Nonetheless, for both authors tying strategies does not necessarily involve the reason of 
leveraging market power from another market, it could be merely the transfer of profits from 
the complementary good market to the monopolist without eliminating competition, like the 
price discrimination purpose of tying (Chen & Riordan, 2013). Furthermore, Carlton et al. 
(2010) refute that tying hurts consumers in presence of price discrimination or exclusion 
effects. In fact, according to Nalebuff (2004) tying is even more profitable for the monopolist 
when it has an entry-deterrence effect. 
Kühn et al. (2005) declares that tying has undoubtedly anticompetitive effects and the 
real debate is recognizing the conditions under which anticompetitive effects occur and what 
criteria should be selected to validate untying. Gayer and Shy (2016) also affirm that tying 
decreases consumer surplus and total welfare in comparison to a scenario of absence of tying 
                                                     
21 For more literature on price discrimination argument of tying. See, for example, Adams and Yellen (1976), 
Schmalensee (1982), McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), Salinger (1995), Matutes and Regibeau (1992), 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Greenlee, Reitman, and Sibley (2008). 
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under high production costs. Although, under low production costs the opposite results 
occur. This is shown by the Microsoft bundling of Microsoft Office (Excel, Word, 
PowerPoint and Exchange), where it has zero marginal costs and the bundle create synergies 
between the products for consumers. And, as the marginal costs rise, the incentive to 
bundling diminishes (Nalebuff, 2004). 
The practice of tying can be also sub-sectioned in two: reversible and irreversible tying. 
Carlton et al. (2010), designates the first as the consumer’s ability to purchase a tied good 
and another rival complementary good simultaneously. The irreversible does not allow the 
simultaneously. In costless reversible tying, establishing a null price for the complementary 
good has no incremental return, like Microsoft’s strategy on Windows’s and Windows Media 
Player. Nonetheless, the motivation for a monopolist to tying, according to Carlton et al. 
(2010) is substantial even without competition. In the presence of rival producers, reversible 
tying is often inefficient since consumers could use the monopolist’s rival complementary 
good even after purchasing the monopolist’s tied product. 
Whinston (1990) states that with competition in the complementary good market, tying 
an essential primary good provides no monopoly returns. The term essential means that all 
applications of the complementary good necessitate the monopolised product, such as 
Microsoft’s Windows and Windows Media Player or IBM’s tabulating machines and 
tabulating cards. However, Whinston (1990) considered assumptions such as irreversible 
tying and, in the absenteeism of competition, the monopolist has no incentive to bundle. 
Carlton et al. (2010) refer that the monopolist’s costs of producing and developing the 
complementary good signify a deadweight loss if consumers are indifferent between the tied 
product and its rivals, similarly to Microsoft’s behaviour in tying complementary software, 
such as movie editing, security programs and instant messaging. Nonetheless, refuting 
Whinston (1990), Gans (2011) declares that in a market for an essential product like operating 
systems, the gain on competition for applications, allows the monopolist to increase revenue 
in the monopoly market. This setting occurs in the Google abuse of market power in 
complementary products. The firm use Android to reinforce its market position on Google 
Search engine (Geradin & Edelman, 2016). 
Recently, several authors begin to include different assumptions into their models in 
order to describe the subtleties of the digital and technological markets. For example, Carlton 
and Waldman (2012) stress the relevance of switching costs and product upgrades on tying. 
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If product upgrades are vital for the complementary product this generates incentives for 
tying. These incentives increase if the complementary good is characterised by switching 
costs. Therefore, a monopolist increases its profits by tying and leveraging if the tying 
product is essential. This is related with several of Microsoft’s bundled programs such as, 
Internet Explorer and Windows Media Player (Carlton et al. 2012). 
More recently, after Whinston (2001), J. Choi and Jeon (2018) highlight the presence of 
network effects in tying practices. According to the latter authors, in models of 
anticompetitive tying and exclusionary contracts in two-sided markets, tying deprives rival’s 
sales and weaken its future competitiveness. Furthermore, Amelio and Jullien (2012) state 
that if network externalities are numerous and competition intense, total welfare increases. 
For instance, in the software industry, the developers of applications write their software 
towards the more widely used operating system. Subsequently, users choose the operating 
system which contains the greatest variety of applications. And as result, it becomes more 
probable for an operative system to become monopolist. This is known as the “applications 
network effect” (Kühn et al., 2005).  
After analysing several different points of view about tying, an important question arises: 
Could tying present potential benefits? The practice seems to benefit consumers when they 
are faced with compatibility and distributing costs (Kühn et al., 2005), accountability if a 
product malfunctions and protection of intellectual property (Carlton & Waldman, 2012). 
The software industry is a perfect example of the positive effects of tying. Though, the 
practice has unclear effects when employ price discrimination (Tirole, 2005). The benefits 
for producers resulting from tying efficiencies derive from economies of scope and efficiency 
of vertical structures (Jeon & Menicucci, 2012). Still, this is not an acceptable justification for 
tying, even in software industry, because the benefits from economies of scope do not rely 
solely on the presence of technical or contractual tying (Kühn et al., 2005). The European 
Commission is very keen on this last aspect. According to Article 101(3a) of TFEU, tying or 
bundling can even produce efficiencies and benefits consumers, but they should not be 
permitted if the same effects are achieved without these two practices. 
3.5. Proposed remedies  
In summary, Tirole (2005) suggests that antitrust tying case’s analysis can be breakdown 
to a three-step procedure: (i) Recognizing if the practices reduce competition in the tied 
market; (ii) identifying if tying hurts consumers; and (iii) if exists an appropriate remedy. 
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Under Article 102 of the EC treaty, Tirole (2005) observed the link between this three-step 
approach and the standard treatment of tying cases. Reclassifying tying as predatory strategy 
(whether it aims at monopolizing the market or protecting it) clarifies the economic analysis. 
Still, it has some limitations. Antitrust authorities may not know if tying has an efficiency 
rationale or purely predatory intention (Tirole, 2005). Conferring to Carlton et al. (2010) 
there are monopolist bundles which have no effect on competition’s entry and exit decisions. 
However, such practice increase monopoly profit and lower rival profits and social welfare. 
Hence, a difficult scenario occurs when the incriminated behaviour has, simultaneously, 
efficiency and anticompetitive rationales. Tirole (2005) states that firms can’t be inefficient 
and not improving their productivity to simply maintain their competitor’s existence. In 
order to measure the welfare, economists often add these two variables but antitrust 
authorities, more specifically the Article 101(3) TFEU, focus more on how the practice 
affects consumer surplus. 
Mandatory untying could be a good antitrust policy because increases consumer’s choice 
and, if pre-installation has costs, which would not be incurred in absent of tying, this measure 
also increases social welfare and competition (Gans, 2011). Carlton and Waldman (2002) also 
corroborate this thesis, stating that mandatory untying increases welfare and could be the 
most effective policy action. Although Kühn et al. (2005) agree with mandatory untying, the 
difficulty is to identify the anticompetitive effects. For instance, in industries where network 
effects are central, such as the software industry, antitrust regulator’s intervention could harm 
future innovation and competitiveness. In such industries, anticompetitive effects are likely 
to exist if there are network-based mechanisms which decreases rival’s investment and R&D. 
Generally, these aspects display hints of intent to exclude and reveals absence of efficiency 
motivations. Therefore, there is a strong case for antitrust intervention (Kühn et al., 2005). 
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4. Google Android Case 
The European Commission declared that Google’s conduct on its smartphone’s services 
and applications has violated EU antitrust rules, more specifically the Article 102.22 The 
process can be divided into three forms of contractual restrictions enforced by the company 
on network operators and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The Mobile 
Application Distribution Agreement (MADA), Revenue Sharing Agreement (RSA) and Anti-
Fragmentation Agreement (AFA). All three have the objective of increasing of Google 
Search traffic through Android Operating System’s users (Etro & Caffarra, 2017; Geradin & 
Edelman, 2016)23. Nevertheless, Cornière and Taylor (2018) claim that the predation case is 
doubtful because Google’s strategies have been present for some years and credible rivals 
still exist on the search engine and browser markets. For example, Bing and Microsoft Edge, 
respectively. 
 As the first type of restriction, the firm leverages its dominance on the market of app 
stores, Google Play app, in order to protect and expand its market power on Google Chrome 
and Search. This practice prevents the entry of new competitors and harms the existing ones 
(J. Choi & Jeon, 2018; Cornière & Taylor, 2018; Edelman, 2015; Etro & Caffarra, 2017). 
According to MADA24, if an OEM chooses Android as its Operating System and intents to 
pre-install the Google Play application, the OEM is required to install other applications 
belonging to the Google Mobile Services (for example, Google Search, Maps, Chrome) even 
if the manufacturer prefers to pay for another competing app (e.g. Bing Search, 
DuckDuckGo, MapQuest or Yahoo Maps)25.  
Rendering to Geradin and Edelman (2016) the Google Play application reveals to be 
crucial, because not having Google Play installed on the handset device constitutes a 
manufacturer's weakness, since the absence of the app results in some incompatibilities with 
                                                     
22 European Commission - Press release “Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on 
Android operating system and applications” released on April 20, 2016. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm.  
23 European Commission - Fact Sheet "Antitrust: Commission opens formal investigation against Google in 
relation to Android mobile operating system," released on April 15, 2015. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm.  
24 Although MADA is confidential, it was available during the Oracle v. Google litigation and provide a general 
understanding of the conditions under which Google licenses its proprietary mobile apps. 
25 Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications [listed elsewhere in the agreement] ... are pre-
installed on the Device." See section 2.1 of the MADA between Google and HTC. 
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other Google apps and its installation ensures that applications using Google APIs26 have 
proper communication with other Google online services (Etro & Caffarra, 2017). 
The MADA does not prevent OEMs from pre-installing other rival’s apps. Still, Google 
requires its apps to be the default apps and displayed on prominent positions on the screen.27  
But two problems arise, pre-installing equal applications is constrained by the limited screen 
space available on mobile devices and limited prominent positions the screen (J. P. Choi, 
Jullien, & Lefouili, 2017; Etro & Caffarra, 2017). Furthermore, as known in the literature of 
tying and similarly to Internet Explorer case, this “default bias” was one of main decisional 
features for the EC to proceed with the accusation (Etro & Caffarra, 2017).  Second to the 
European Commission's investigation in 2016, 95% of search queries were made using 
Google Search on devices that had it pre-installed. Meanwhile, on Windows Mobile devices, 
where Google Search and Chrome are not pre-installed, less than 25% of all search queries 
were made via Google Search. The European Commission specifies that "consumers rarely 
download applications that would provide the same functionality as an app that is already 
pre-installed (unless the pre-installed app is of particularly poor quality)."28 The “default bias” 
is then confirmed in this circumstance. 
As the second part of the case, some selected mobile network communications and 
smartphone manufacturers received anticompetitive financial incentives to pre-install 
Chrome and Search in detriment of rival applications29. These allegations are confirmed by 
the Revenue Sharing Agreements (RSAs), where a share of Google’s advertising revenue 
from search goes to OEMs if the latter commits not to install rival search engines (Geradin 
& Edelman, 2016). This strategy makes the non-negative price constraint of two-sided 
market irrelevant on the producer side. Due to low marginal costs in digital markets, this 
results in an optimal pricing strategy with negative prices. Thus, firms could recoup their 
losses on the consumer side of the two-sided market (Armstrong, 2006; J. Choi & Jeon, 2018; 
Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Furthermore, this aspect of the case reveals intent of “naked 
exclusion” contracts rather than tying practices (Etro & Caffarra, 2017). 
                                                     
26 Google APIs is a set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) developed by Google which allows 
communication with Google Mobile Services such as Search, Gmail, Maps or Chrome. 
27 The phone manufacturer must set “Google Search ... as the default search provider for all Web search access 
points.” See MADA Section 3.4(4). The same requirement applies to Google’s Network Location Provider 
service. 
28 See supra (n 1). 
29 See supra (n 1). 
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Google prevents the entry of competition on search engines worldwide, if MADA and 
RSA are present on a global scale. A possible entrant could not offer a payment to enter the 
market in a different country or region. In fact, the entrant would have the impossible task 
to bid against Google RSA on a worldwide scale (Geradin & Edelman, 2016). 
The third part of the Google-Android case is the leverage of dominance in the 
smartphone app market to the operating system market. More concretely, an OEM which is 
a Google Partner (which pre-installs the “GMS package”), is required to sign an “Anti-
Fragmentation Agreement” (AFA). This agreement prohibits OEMs to sell devices running 
on Android Forks30 or on any modified operating systems based on Android open-source 
code. The firm claims that this condition helps to avoid incompatibilities between Google 
applications. As consequence, this restriction closes an opportunity for its OEMs to pre-
install apps on operating systems which, in fact, are not owned by Google (Etro & Caffarra, 
2017) and according to Geradin and Edelman (2016), the AFA makes harder for distributing 
a modified version of Android for any OEM because the latter “gambles” its sales if they do 
not sign such deal and sell Android Fork devices without GMS.  
These practices combined have denied competitors the opportunity to compete on their 
merits and allowed Google to reinforce its market share on its search engine. Google Search 
and Chrome pre-installation, where the latter have Google Search as its default search engine, 
makes unbearable for competitors to scale through search algorithms and generate online 
advertising revenue. Although Google already has a substantial market share in the search 
engine market, the bundle has the objective to increase its sources of income, such as 
advertising. On two-sided platforms like Google’s applications (consumers and advertisers), 
this is a common practice: a platform operator provides a service to users without directly 
charge it. Then, the operator chooses to profit from fees charged by third parties (R. H. Bork 
& Sidak, 2012; Geradin & Edelman, 2016). Those third parties are application developers 
and advertisers. The revenues come from in-app advertising plus a fixed percentage of app 
developers’ revenues (Etro & Caffarra, 2017). 
In this context, Google may increase its advertising revenue by controlling a larger share 
of services, by having a “Google ecosystem”. In addition, on two-sided markets, exists 
barriers to entry mainly due to network effects: the search engine becomes more attractive 
                                                     
30 Operating Systems programmed by anyone based on Android SO’s open source code. 
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for advertisers as the number of consumers increases (Geradin & Edelman, 2016). As 
consequence of these three practices, Google harms competition by foreclosure the search 
engine market and may extend their tying benefits to influencing consumers’ choices and 
favouring its other services (Edelman, 2015; Geradin & Edelman, 2016). Additionally, since 
Google face less competition in its Search engine, this would also reduce Google’s incentives 
to invest in innovation to deter entry (Etro & Caffarra, 2017) and prevents consumers from 
enjoying different or even better search engines in the mobile handset industry (J. Choi & 
Jeon, 2018; Etro & Caffarra, 2017; Geradin & Edelman, 2016). Overall, this practices of 
contractual tying, approves the premise of tying for the leverage purpose (J. Choi & Jeon, 
2018).  
Nevertheless, Sidak (2015), author of a paper commissioned by Google, states that  
MADA’s requirements have no anticompetitive effects, on the contrary. The contract 
increases the demand for mobile devices, reduce the risk of competitor’s free riding on the 
investment of Android OS and prevents fragmentation of the GMS. Therefore, this 
maintains the quality of consumer experience and benefits manufacturers, advertisers, mobile 
carriers, consumers and app developers. As opposing view, Geradin and Edelman (2016) 
claim that consumers are far from “free-riding” on Google investments, exemplifying with 
the Google Play, where Google retains a commission of 30% when users buy an app, and 
YouTube, where industry analysts estimate that YouTube covers its costs with its advertising 
revenue (Geradin & Edelman, 2016).  
Besides the reasons mentioned above, Google started to bundle its applications without 
charging OEMs in 2007 when the Android OS was first launched. The purpose was to 
persuade manufacturers and consumers to select Android services instead of Symbian or 
Windows mobile. Since then, Google committed to delivering an open source operative 
system with free application programming interface and free app store (Etro & Caffarra, 
2017). This shaped a quality advantage of the Android services, as application developers 
choose to write their apps for Android OS. Subsequently, network effects arose, because 
consumers prefer an app store or operative system which offers the superior number of apps 
and vice-versa (Etro & Caffarra, 2017). 
Etro and Caffarra (2017) suggests three potential solutions in order to solve the 
foreclosure effects and the entry-deterring implications of Google’s tying practices. As a first 
measure, Google Play and GMS applications should be offered on a standalone basis and, as 
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Geradin and Edelman (2016) also suggests, charging OEMs a positive fee for some of 
Google’s products. The benefits for OEMs and consumers will be the faculty of having 
alternative applications. Then, product differentiation which will intensify competition on 
the upstream level. On the next subsection, shows Google following this remedy. 
As a second measure, the cessation of AFAs. This would force app and operating system 
developers to diversify and compete on the merits resulting in diversity of operating systems. 
The third measure, prohibiting Google payments to OEMs for exclusivity and prominent 
screen positions of GMS. Competition and innovation between search engines will be 
enhanced and rival search engines would be able to pay for pre-installation and outbid 
Google’s RSA with the possibility of those payments being transferred to consumers through 
lower prices for the Android mobiles (Etro & Caffarra, 2017).  
Alternatively, OEMs could be engaged in exclusivity contracts with rival search providers 
(Etro & Caffarra, 2017) or pre-installing a number of competing apps, thereby, allowing 
consumers to choose their default search engine by presenting them with a choice of multiple 
options. Through this method, pre-installation efficiencies (no installation costs for 
consumers) still be realised without tying (Kühn et al., 2005). This latter remedy is also one 
of the changes implemented by Google recently. On the following subsection, on the last 
paragraph, this remedy is explained with more detail.  
4.1. Google’s response to the European Commission decision 
On the same day when the European Commission issued a decision against Android, 
Google’s CEO Sundar Pichai wrote on the official Google Blog the intention to appeal the 
EC decision31. Google’s CEO argued that the free distribution of Android OS created more 
flexibility, choice and opportunity to users, phone makers and app developers around the 
world. The compatibility rules ensure technical compatibility regardless of the device and 
guarantees that open-source platforms do not fragment. Therefore, giving users, developers 
and phone makers a reliable operative system, which runs Google’s applications on every 
device, regardless of the phone size or manufacturer.  
While the appeal was pending, Google presented three new licensing options with effect 
on October 29 of 2018 for all new smartphones and tablets launched in the European 
                                                     
31 See supra (n 5).  
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Economic Area (EEA), with the purpose of complying with the EC’s decision.32 The first 
change was updating the agreements with OEMs, by allowing Google partners to also sell 
non-compatible, or forked devices for the EEA. As the second modification, device 
manufacturers can license the GMS separately from Google Search or Chrome. However, 
since these two apps installed together was one of the reasons which allowed Android to be 
free, Google introduced a new paid licensing agreement for mobile devices shipped into the 
EEA. As the third change, Google created distinct licenses to Google Search and Chrome. 
More recently, similarly to the Geradin and Edelman (2016) proposed remedy, Google 
announced that it will start presenting to Android users in Europe an option to download 
other search apps and browsers33. According to the technology firm, two screens will appear: 
one for search apps and another for browsers, each containing a total of five apps, including 
any that is already installed. When the user downloads a search app it is given the option to 
select it as the default search engine when Chrome is open. These alterations will apply to 
both existing and new Android phones in Europe. 
Figure 1 - Search and browser options 
Source: Google Blog 
  
                                                     
32 See “Complying with the EC’s Android decision”. Published Oct 16, 2018. Available at 
https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/complying-ecs-android-decision/  
33 See “Presenting search app and browser options to Android users in Europe” Published Apr 18, 2019. 
Available at https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/presenting-search-app-and-browser-
options-android-users-europe/  
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5. Model 
5.1. Baseline model 
In this chapter, a variant of the baseline model of Cornière and Taylor (2018) is explained 
and presented with the objective to understand and scrutinize the Google-Android case on 
a theoretical Industrial Organization framework. In this dissertation, this model will serve as 
the foundation for the modified model with compatibility costs. 
The model consists of a multiproduct upstream bundling model structured as follows: A 
downstream company (𝐷) sells a finished good, made from components obtained from 
upstream suppliers, to final consumers at price 𝑝. The components are divided into two 
categories, 𝐴 and 𝐵. For component 𝐴, firm 𝑈1 is the sole producer. For component 𝐵, 𝑈1 
and 𝑈2 firms compete to sell their own type (𝐵1 and 𝐵2, respectively). Firm 𝐷 can only install 
one version of component 𝐵.  
The market in question is the smartphone market, where the components that constitute 
the final product are pre-installed applications and as the final product, mobile devices. 
Figure 2 - Baseline Model 
 
Cornière and Taylor (2018) assume, for brevity, that components 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 are perfect 
substitutes and essential to the final product, generating a direct revenue of 𝑛𝑟𝑖 for 𝑈𝑖 from 
𝑛 consumers’ activity on the final product (𝑖 = 1,2). This revenue may come from “in-app 
purchases”, advertising or sale of consumer data34. Only one 𝐵𝑖 can be installed due to the 
finished good’s limited capacity (i.e. only one default application can be installed for each 
                                                     
34 The authors refer to this direct revenue as the efficiency of 𝐵𝑖  component. In the rest of the dissertation, I 
also use the term efficiency for brevity. In a way, if one component generates more revenue allowing the 
upstream firm to charge a lower price (higher slotting-fee) for the component, in a general way, the last may be 
considered more efficient than its rival. 
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function and space on the mobile device’s home screen) and 𝐵𝑖 does not compete with 𝐴 as 
they have different functions.  
Our following two models are founded on the same assumptions, except that component 
𝐵𝑖 is now considered non-essential. The justification for this modification relies on the 
Google-Android case specificities. The tied component appears to be non-essential to OEMs 
mobile device’ well-functioning nor affects consumer demand for mobiles devices. For 
example, Google only sells Google Play (𝐴) if OEMs install conjunctively Google Chrome 
and Search (𝐵1). The demand for the finished product may change if Google Play app is not 
installed, because of its important services for the well-functioning of Android (Geradin & 
Edelman, 2016). Meanwhile, Chrome and Search applications do not affect the smartphone 
performance when they are not pre-installed and they can be downloaded any time after the 
consumer purchase the handset device. 
The Demand for the finished product is designated as 𝑄(𝑝, 𝑆), where 𝑝 constitutes the 
price and 𝑆 ∈ {{𝐵𝑖}, {𝐴}, {𝐴, 𝐵𝑖}} is the possible set of components that 𝐷 may install. The 
authors establish the following:  
i) for any given 𝑆, the revenue function of the downstream firm is 𝑝𝑄(𝑝, 𝑆), which 
is quasi-concave in 𝑝 and maximized at 𝑝𝑆.  
ii) 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 are perfect substitutes from consumer’s perspective: 𝑄(𝑝, {𝐴, 𝐵1}) =
𝑄(𝑝, {𝐴, 𝐵2} and 𝑄(𝑝, {𝐵1}) = 𝑄(𝑝, {𝐵2}). 
The profits of the downstream firm are described as: Π ≡ 𝑝{𝐴,𝐵𝑖}𝑄(𝑝{𝐴,𝐵𝑖}, {𝐴, 𝐵𝑖}) when 
𝐴 is installed in conjunction with 𝐵𝑖; 𝜋 ≡ 𝑝{𝐵𝑖}𝑄(𝑝{𝐵𝑖}, {𝐵𝑖}) when 𝐴 is not installed 
alongside 𝐵𝑖; and Π ≡ 𝑝{𝐴}𝑄(𝑝{𝐴}, {𝐴}) when only component 𝐴 is installed. Therefore, it is 
considered that component 𝐵𝑖 does not bring any extra value for the finished product or to 
the downstream firm for being pre-installed. As a result, the downstream firm only installs 
𝐵𝑖 if it increases 𝐷’s profit or at least if does not diminishes it. The model is constituted by 
two key assumptions: 
Retail complementary - The finished product is more valuable when component 𝐴 is 
installed, regardless of component 𝐵𝑖. In such case, more consumers buy the finished good 
and the downstream firm sales revenue is larger. 
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𝑄 ≡ 𝑄(𝑝{𝐴,𝐵𝑖}, {𝐴, 𝐵𝑖}) = 𝑄(𝑝{𝐴}, {𝐴}) > 𝑄(𝑝{𝐵𝑖}, {𝐵𝑖}) ≡ 𝑞   and   Π > 𝜋 
Contractual friction – Upstream firms can only receive lump-sum transfers for the 
installation of their components in the finished product. Nevertheless, 𝑈𝑖 earns 𝑟𝑖 per 
consumer served. Thus, upstream firms have a positive per-unit income from each 
consumer. The lump-sum transfers are denoted as 𝐹𝑋 and constitute the upstream demand 
from 𝐷 for the installation of component 𝑋. A negative value of 𝐹𝑋 corresponds to a 
payment to 𝐷, that is, a slotting fee. Revealing that upstream producers are willing to pay for 
𝐷 to install their applications on the smartphone. 
𝐹𝐵𝑖 represents the lump-sum transfer from the downstream firm to 𝑈𝑖 for the 
installation of component 𝐵𝑖. 𝐹𝐴 is the lump-sum payment from 𝐷 to 𝑈1 for the installation 
of component 𝐴. 𝐹1 constitutes the lump-sum transfer from the downstream firm to 𝑈1 for 
the installation of the bundle. 
Payoffs:  
𝐷’s profit if it installs 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑖: 𝑉𝐷 =  Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖  
𝐷’s profit if it installs the 𝐴 and 𝐵1 bundle: ?̂?𝐷 =  Π −  ?̂?1 
𝐷’s profit if only 𝐵𝑖 is installed: 𝑉𝐷 =  π − 𝐹𝐵𝑖  
𝐷’s profit if only 𝐴 is installed: 𝑉𝐷 =  Π −  𝐹𝐴 
𝑈1’s profit if 𝐴 and 𝐵1 are installed: 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑄 
𝑈1’s profit if bundle 𝐴 and 𝐵1 is installed: ?̂?1 = ?̂?1 + 𝑟1𝑄 
𝑈1’s profit if only 𝐵1 is installed: 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑞 
𝑈1’s profit if only 𝐴 is installed: 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 
𝑈2’s profit if 𝐵2 is installed alongside 𝐴: 𝑉2 = 𝐹𝐵2 + 𝑟2𝑄 
𝑈2’s profit if 𝐵2 is installed without 𝐴: 𝑉2 = 𝐹𝐵2 + 𝑟2𝑞 
 
Timing: At 𝑡 = 0, 𝑈1 announces whether it bundles 𝐴 and 𝐵1. At 𝑡 = 1, upstream firms 
make simultaneous offers to the downstream firm (𝐹𝐴, 𝐹𝐵𝑖 , 𝐹1). At 𝑡 = 2, the downstream 
firm decides which component(s) to install and chooses a final price (𝑆, 𝑝). At 𝑡 = 3, payoffs 
are realized. The attention is restricted to the subgame-perfect equilibria and this dissertation 
study the two subgames without bundling and with bundling in turn. 
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5.2. Model with timing modification 
Using the model of Cornière and Taylor (2018) with the same assumptions (except  𝐵𝑖 
is a non-essential component) cited on the previous subsection, the sequence of the 
negotiations is modified in order to verify if the same results hold. More concretely, if 
bundling continues to be strictly necessary in order to capture the global value of component 
𝐴, if bundling reduces 𝑈2’s willingness of paying slotting fees and lastly, how 𝑈2 deciding 
secondly affects the optimal decision of 𝑈1 to bundle. 
New timing: At 𝑡 = 0, 𝑈1 announces whether it bundles 𝐴 and 𝐵1. At 𝑡 = 1, 𝑈1 make an 
offer to the downstream firm for the installation of components 𝐴 and 𝐵1 (𝐹𝐴, 𝐹𝐵1 , 𝐹1). At 
𝑡 = 2, 𝑈2 make an offer to the downstream firm for the installation of component 𝐵2 (𝐹𝐵2). 
At 𝑡 = 3, the downstream firm decides which component(s) to install and chooses a final 
price (𝑆, 𝑝). Payoffs are realized at 𝑡 = 4. 
There are four possible decisions for 𝑈1 to maximize its profit: Sell only component 𝐴; sell 
only 𝐵1; sell 𝐴 and 𝐵1 in separate marketing; or bundle 𝐴 and 𝐵1 together. 
Scenario 1) 𝑼𝟏 only sells 𝑨. 
i) 𝑈1 offers 𝐹𝐴 =  𝛱 − 𝜋 
ii) 𝑈2 offers 𝐹𝐵2 = 0 − 𝜖
35 
iii) Upstream firm’s profits are 𝑉1 =  𝛱 − 𝜋 and 𝑉2 = 𝑄𝑟2 and downstream firm’s profit is 
𝑉𝐷 =  𝜋. 
Proof.  i) For 𝐷 to be indifferent between choosing the components 𝐴 and 𝐵2 or only 
installing the component 𝐵2: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵2 ⇔ 𝐹𝐴 ≤  Π − π. Thus, 𝐹𝐴 =  Π −
π is the maximum lump-sum payment that 𝑈1 could demand for profit maximization and 
for 𝐴 to be installed. ii) Alternatively, in case of 𝐷 being indifferent between 𝐴 and 𝐵2 or 
none: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ 0 ⇔ Π −  Π + 𝜋 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ 0 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵2 ≤ 𝜋. And for 𝐷 to be 
indifferent between installing 𝐵2: Π − 𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ Π − 𝐹𝐴 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵2 ≤ 0. Therefore, firm 𝑈2 
face no competition and offer the minimum slotting fee 𝐹𝐵2 = 0. iii) The upstream firm’s 
                                                     
35 𝜖 represents the minimal size of price change. The 𝜖 is removed from the remainder of this model, because 
it does not change the equilibrium, although it is necessary to it. That is, the most efficient firm could offer 𝜖 
and representing a Pareto improvement of the least efficient firm’ offer. 
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profits are 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 and 𝑉2 = 𝐹𝐵2 + 𝑄𝑟2 and downstream firm’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 = Π − 𝐹𝐴 −
𝐹𝐵2 .                                                                                                                                         ∎ 
This strategy allows 𝑈1 to capture the direct value of component 𝐴 (𝛱 − 𝜋) but 𝑈2 
becomes the sole seller in the market of component 𝐵𝑖. Then, since firm 𝑈1’s monopoly 
profit in the market 𝐴 it is already secured, this is not its finest strategy, because it cannot 
capture the indirect value of 𝐴36 (𝑄 − 𝑞) nor the profit for selling 𝐵1. 𝑈2 cannot charge 𝜋 for 
𝐵2 installation because the latter component is non-essential. Therefore, 𝐷 only installs 𝐵2 
if it maintains or increases its profit. 
 
Scenario 2) 𝑼𝟏 only sells 𝑩𝟏 (𝒓𝒊 ≥ 𝒓𝒋). 
i) 𝑈𝑖 offers 𝐹𝐵𝑖 = −𝑟𝑗𝑞 
ii) 𝑈𝑗 ’s rejected offer is 𝐹𝐵𝑗 = −𝑟𝑗𝑞 
iii) 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑞(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑗) and 𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑟1, 𝑟2}𝑞 
Proof.  i) In order to 𝐷 install 𝐵𝑖 instead of 𝐵𝑗: π − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵𝑗 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝐹𝐵𝑗 . In the 
absence of component 𝐴, the quantity of final products sold it will be 𝑞. Therefore 𝐹𝐵𝑖 =
−𝑟𝑗𝑞 because it is the maximum offer that 𝑈𝑗 could afford. ii) 𝐹𝐵𝑗 = −𝑟𝑗𝑞 because any offer 
under −𝑟𝑗𝑞 will make 𝑈𝑗 incur in losses. iii) 𝑈𝑖’s profit is 𝑉𝑖 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖𝑞 = −𝑞𝑟𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑞 =
𝑞(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑗) and 𝐷’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 = 𝜋 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑟1, 𝑟2}𝑞.                                         ∎ 
𝑈1’s profit in this scenario is the lowest compared to its profits with other strategies. 
Moreover, the success of 𝑈1 on installing 𝐵1 will depend on the efficiency
37 of the 
components (𝑟1, 𝑟2). Therefore, in this scenario, 𝑈1 would be “betting” on its efficiency and 
tossing away its monopoly profit on market 𝐴. 
 
Scenario 3) 𝑼𝟏 sells 𝑨 and 𝑩𝟏 in separate marketing (𝒓𝒊 ≥ 𝒓𝒋). 
i) 𝑈𝑗 ’s rejected offer is 𝐹𝐵𝑗 = −𝑟𝑗𝑄 
                                                     
36 See Scenario 3, for further explanation about the direct and indirect value of component 𝐴. 
37 𝐵𝑖 ’s efficiency is denoted by 𝑟𝑖 , but is the same as saying unit revenue of 𝐵𝑖 . In other words, if 𝑈𝑖 firm can 
offer better slotting fees because of its higher revenues it is more efficient. 
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ii) 𝑈𝑖 offers 𝐹𝐵𝑖 = −𝑟𝑗𝑄 
iii) 𝑈1 offers 𝐹𝐴 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 
iv) If 𝑟1 ≥ 𝑟2 𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 + 𝑄(𝑟1 − 𝑟2). If 𝑟1 < 𝑟2, it is 𝑉1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 and 
𝑈2’s profit is 𝑉2 = 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1). The downstream firm’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 +
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑟1, 𝑟2}𝑄 in both cases. 
Proof.  i) 𝑈𝑗 knows that 𝐴 could be installed alongside 𝐵𝑗, then 𝐹𝐵𝑗 = −𝑟𝑗𝑄 is the maximum 
offer (minimum value) without incurring in any losses. ii) There are two situations where 𝐷 
is indifferent between installing 𝐵𝑖:  First, in order to 𝐷 install 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑖 instead of 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑗: 
Π − 𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≥ Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑗 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝐹𝐵𝑗 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≤ −𝑟𝑗𝑄. Second, for 𝐷 prefers to 
install 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑖 over component 𝐴: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≥ Π − 𝐹𝐴 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≤ 0. Thus, the 
maximum offer that 𝑈𝑖 will make for 𝐵𝑖 is the maximum slotting fee of the least efficient 
firm (𝑈𝑗), which is 𝐹𝐵𝑖 = −𝑟𝑗𝑄. iii) Assuming that 𝐷 wants to install 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑖 instead of 
only 𝐵𝑗: Π − 𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵𝑗 ⇔ 𝐹𝐴 ≤ Π − π − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 + 𝐹𝐵𝑗 . And, in order to 𝐷 prefers 
to install 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑖 instead of 𝐵𝑖 alone: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ⇔  Π − π ≤ 𝐹𝐴. Then, 
𝐹𝐴 = Π − 𝜋 is the best profit maximization offer that 𝑈1 could make for 𝐴 to be installed. 
iv) 𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑄 = Π − π + Q(𝑟1 − 𝑟2) if 𝑟1 ≥ 𝑟2. If 𝑟1 < 𝑟2, 𝑉1 =
𝛱 − 𝜋 and 𝑈2’s profit is 𝑉2 = 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1). In both cases, the downstream firm’s profit is 
𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑟1, 𝑟2}𝑄.                                                                                                      ∎ 
When 𝑟1 < 𝑟2 the firm 𝑈2 have two similar profits under separate marketing: When 
𝑈1 sells 𝐴 and 𝐵1, it has 𝑉2 = 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) and when 𝑈1 only sell only 𝐵1, it has 𝑉2 = 𝑞(𝑟2 −
𝑟1). Although the profits are slightly different, they have the same logic behind it. The 
difference of the efficiencies of 𝐵2 and 𝐵1 (𝑟1 < 𝑟2) allows 𝑈2 to offer a slightly better 
slotting fee than 𝑈1, which is sufficient for 𝐷 to choose the component 𝐵2 over 𝐵1. The two 
profits only differ in 𝑄 and 𝑞, due to component 𝐴 being installed alongside 𝐵𝑖 or not. 
Although, despite this difference in quantities component 𝐵2 is pre-installed in both 
scenarios. 
The downstream firm’s decision of installing component 𝐵𝑖 dependent on 𝑟𝑖 is 
represented graphically in Figure 3. The curve 𝑟1 = 𝑟2 represents 𝐷’s indifference curve, that 
is, the condition where the downstream firm has the same profits if installs either 𝐴 with 𝐵1 
or 𝐴 with 𝐵2. In other words, the line where firm 𝐷 is indifferent between choosing the two 
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latter options. Thus, if 𝑟1 > 𝑟2, the downstream firm installs 𝐴 with 𝐵1 and if 𝑟1 < 𝑟2, 𝐷 
installs 𝐴 with 𝐵2, as the proof demonstrates.
38 
Figure 3 – Installed components under separate marketing 
 
Through the three preceding scenarios it is inferred that when component 𝑨 is 
installed, it adds value to the finished product by two ways. Through direct value (Π −
𝜋), where the firm 𝑈1 can capture this value by offering 𝐹𝐴 = Π − 𝜋, and through indirect 
value (𝑄 − 𝑞) to the downstream firm, since 𝐴 increase the willingness of 𝐵𝑖 firms to pay 
slotting fees because 𝑈𝑖 knows that if 𝐴 is installed their revenue grow from 𝑞𝑟𝑖 to 𝑄𝑟𝑖,.  
Nevertheless, 𝑼𝟏 cannot capture the indirect value of 𝑨 through separated 
marketing. For 𝑈1 to be able to capture the global value by separate marketing, it is 
necessary that 𝑈2 does not offer 𝐹𝐵2 < −𝑞𝑟2, meaning that, 𝑈2 has to offer 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2 
instead of 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑄𝑟2.  For such offer to take place, firm 𝑈2 must expect that 𝐵2 cannot 
be installed alongside with 𝐴, and for that to happen 𝐷 must prefer to install only 𝐵2 instead 
of 𝐴 with 𝐵2: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 < π − 𝐹𝐵2 ⇔ 𝐹𝐴 >  Π − π.  Thus, when 𝑈2 observes 𝐹𝐴 >
 Π − π, it will offer 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2. However, if 𝑈1 offers 𝐹𝐴 > Π − π, the downstream firm 
does not acquire 𝐴 and installs only 𝐵𝑖. Thus, bundling is necessary to capture the global 
value of 𝐴. 
                                                     
38 Scenario 2 has the same reasoning behind 𝐷’s choice of 𝐵𝑖  components, the only difference is that 
component 𝐴 is absent. Therefore, this curve represents, in the same way, the 𝐷’s indifferent curve. 
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Scenario 4) 𝑼𝟏 bundles 𝑨 and 𝑩𝟏 together. 
i) Firm 𝑈1 offers  ?̂?1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 + ?̂?𝐵2 
ii) Firm 𝑈2 offers ?̂?𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2 
iii) Downstream firm’s profit is ?̂?𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑞𝑟2. Firm 𝑈1 profit is ?̂?1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑞𝑟2 +
𝑟1𝑄 
Proof.  i) In order to 𝐷 accept the bundle instead of only installing component 𝐵2: ?̂?𝐷 ≥
𝑉𝐷 ⇔ 𝛱 − ?̂?1 ≥ 𝜋 − ?̂?𝐵2 ⇔ ?̂?1 ≤ 𝛱 − 𝜋 + ?̂?𝐵2. Therefore, ?̂?1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 + ?̂?𝐵2 because it 
is the maximum value which 𝑈1 could charge to make 𝐷 indifferent between installing the 
two options. ii) 𝑈2 anticipates, on a bundling scenario, that 𝐵2 cannot be installed alongside 
𝐴, meaning that the number of sales of the finished product when component 𝐵2 is installed 
is 𝑞. Thus, ?̂?𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2 is the best offer that 𝑈2 could afford, without incurring in any losses. 
iii) Upstream firm’s profit is ?̂?1 = ?̂?1 + 𝑟1𝑄 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑟1𝑄 and downstream firm’s 
profit is ?̂?𝐷 = Π − ?̂?1.                                                                                                         ∎ 
Through bundling, 𝑈1 has now the capability of capturing the global value of 𝐴. Also, 
bundling relaxes 𝑩𝒊 competition as it decreases 𝑼𝟐’s willingness to pay slotting fees 
for the installation of 𝑩𝟐. When 𝑈1 decides to bundle, firm 𝑈2 knows that 𝐵2 cannot be 
installed alongside component 𝐴. Consequently, if 𝐵2 is installed, the demand for the finished 
product it will be lower than the demand for the finished product with component 𝐴 
installed, that is, the revenue of 𝑈2 will be 𝑞𝑟2 instead of 𝑄𝑟2. Thus, in the presence of 
bundling, 𝑈2’s slotting fee is reduced from 𝑄𝑟2 to 𝑞𝑟2.  
From the downstream firm’s perspective, the more profitable scenario is when 
𝑼𝟏 sells both products in separate marketing (𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑟1, 𝑟2}𝑄). This result 
occurs due to the increased competition on 𝐵𝑖 market, which compels the upstream firms to 
offer their highest slotting fee possible, and due to the possibility of component 𝐴 being 
installed alongside 𝐵2, which produce the indirect value, which 𝑈1 cannot capture through 
separate marketing.  
?̂?𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2 is the best offer that 𝑈2 could afford, without incurring in any losses on 
a bundling scenario. Although, supposing 𝑟1 < 𝑟2, would F̂B2 = −𝑞𝑟1 be feasible and what 
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is 𝐷’ response? Expressly, how 𝒓𝟏 and 𝒓𝟐 impact the optimal decision of 𝑼𝟏 to bundle 
𝑨 and 𝑩𝟏? When 𝑟1 ≥ 𝑟2 it is already known from previous calculations that bundling is, as 
expected, the most profitable strategy for 𝑈1 than any other strategy (?̂?1 > 𝑉1𝐴+𝐵1 > 𝑉1𝐴 >
𝑉1𝐵1)
39. Hence, it is important to know what is the best strategy for 𝑈1 when 𝑟1 < 𝑟2. 
If 𝑟1 < 𝑟2, 𝑈1’s more profitable options are bundling or selling only component 𝐴. 
Why only those two options? Because the downstream firm will always accept 𝐹𝐵2 over 𝐹𝐵1 
when 𝑈1 sells 𝐴 and 𝐵1 in separate marketing
40 or when 𝑈1 only sells 𝐵1. Therefore, as 
𝑉1𝐴+𝐵1 = 𝑉1𝐴 > 𝑉1𝐵1  the upstream firm 𝑈1 will only choose between bundling or selling 
only component 𝐴. In summary, 𝑈1 bundles when ?̂?1 ≥ 𝑉1𝐴 ⇔ Π − π − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑟1𝑄 ≥ Π −
π ⇔ 𝑟1𝑄 ≥ 𝑞𝑟2 ⇔
𝑟1
𝑟2
≥
𝑞
𝑄
. 
Figure 4 – Installed components and optimal bundling decision 
 
?̂?𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟1 may not be feasible, even 𝑟1 < 𝑟2 on a bundling setup, because 𝑈2 and 
𝑈1 still have margin for improving their offers. Since they are in Bertrand competition, both 
firms will offer the best price (slotting fee) until one or both firms reach null profits (bids its 
maximum offer). In this case, ?̂?𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2 is 𝑈2’s maximum offer and 𝑈1 offers ?̂?1 = 𝛱 −
                                                     
39 ?̂?1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑟1𝑄;  𝑉1𝐴+𝐵1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 + 𝑄(𝑟1 − 𝑟2);  𝑉1𝐴 =  𝛱 − 𝜋;  𝑉1𝐵1 = 𝑞(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑗). 
40 Scenario 3, where 𝑉1𝐴+𝐵1 = 𝑉1𝐴 = 𝛱 − 𝜋. 
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𝜋 − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑟1𝑄 leaving 𝐷 indifferent between installing both options, but as 𝑈1 has the 
faculty of offering a slightly better slotting fee, 𝐷 installs 𝐵1. Although, if 𝑟2 >
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 the 𝑈2 
firm will offer 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟1, but in this case 𝑈2 has no competition because 𝑈1 choose to 
only sell 𝐴. Therefore when 𝑟2 ≤
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 the most profitable strategy for firm 𝑈1 is to bundle 
and 𝐷 installs the bundle. Although, when 𝑟2 >
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 the optimal option for 𝑈1 is to sell only 
𝐴 and the downstream firm installs 𝐴 and 𝐵2 through separate marketing. 
In this scenario, the blue curve from Figure 4 (𝑟2 =
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1) represents the downstream 
firm’s indifference between installing the bundle or installing only component 𝐵2. 
Nonetheless, contrary to the previous scenario, the curve also signifies the limit of the 
optimality of 𝑈1’s bundling decision. In other words, it represents the limit value of 𝑟2 that 
stops bundling from being the most profitable strategy for 𝑈1. Therefore, when 𝑟2 >
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1, 
the graph shows separate marketing with 𝐴 and 𝐵2 instead of only component 𝐵2, because 
in such circumstance, although 𝐷 reject the bundle, 𝑈1 only sell component 𝐴. 
Bundling has anticompetitive effects because when 𝑈1 sells 𝐴 and 𝐵1 in separate 
marketing, 𝑈2 only need to guarantee that 𝑄𝑟2 > 𝑄𝑟1 for 𝐵2 to be installed and have profit. 
Meanwhile, when 𝑈1 bundles, the previous condition is not sufficient. 𝑈2 have now to ensure 
that 𝑞𝑟2 > 𝑄𝑟1 for 𝐵2 to be installed. Meaning that the efficiency of 𝐵2 (𝑟2) must now be 
greater than the efficiency of 𝐵1 by the proportion of the increase in sales that component 
𝐴 causes when installed (𝑄 𝑞⁄ ). From the downstream firm’s perspective, 𝐷 is indifferent 
between installing 𝐵1 or 𝐵2 if 𝑟2 = 𝑟1 in separate marketing. Nonetheless, when 𝑈1 bundles 
its two components, the component 𝐵1 becomes more attractive to 𝐷 because installing 𝐵2 
implies not installing 𝐴. Therefore, when faced with the bundle option, the downstream firm 
only becomes indifferent between 𝐵1 or 𝐵2 if 𝑟2 =
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1. This change of 𝐷’s indifference is 
represented by the increase of slope on 𝐷’s indifference curve from 𝑟2 = 𝑟1 to 𝑟2 =
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1, 
resulting in the grey area which characterises the anticompetitive effect.  
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The anticompetitive effect (grey area) is quantified by 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞). This value 
represents the difference between the two curves41 which is the exact same value of 𝑈1’s 
profit increase when it bundles compared to its second most profitable option, selling 𝐴 and 
𝐵1 in separate marketing. 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞) is also the value of 𝑈2’s profit decrease. Hence, 𝑈1 can 
capture the indirect value of 𝐴 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞) and leverage its dominance in market 𝐴 to increase 
its profits in market 𝐵𝑖. 
 
5.3. Model with compatibility costs 
On the previous chapter, I confirm the Cornière and Taylor (2018) results with additional 
methods and interpretations through the timing and assumption modifications. Hence, the 
previous chapter is helpful for the building of the following adjustment which attempts to 
approximate the baseline model to the reality of Google-Android case. 
On the intention to appeal the European Commission’s decision, Google alleged that 
the contractual tying of Google Play, Google Search and Chrome ensures technical 
compatibility for device manufacturers and consumers regardless the device, due to its 
Google APIs (Geradin & Edelman, 2016). Furthermore, the presence of Google Search and 
Chrome applications is the major reason why Android is free for OEMs42. Lastly, the 
MADAs prevents the fragmentation of the open-source platforms by maintaining the 
“Google ecosystem”, otherwise the quality of consumer experience is degraded (Sidak, 2015).  
Therefore, in order to embody the alleged incompatibility problems that Google’s rival 
applications (𝐵2) incur when they are pre-installed instead of other GMS apps such as 
Google Search or Chrome (𝐵1) and the increase of funds that the latter two apps cause when 
installed together with Google Play (𝐴), I introduce the assumption that there are synergies 
for 𝑈1 when component 𝐵1 is installed alongside 𝐴. In other words, 𝑈1 does not face 
compatibility costs when 𝐷 installs 𝐵1 alongside 𝐴, because both components belong to the 
same “ecosystem”. Meanwhile, since 𝐵2 is not perfectly harmonized with component 𝐴 nor 
the operative system of the finished product. So, its pre-installation results in compatibility 
costs. 
                                                     
41 The difference between two curves is (𝑄𝑟1 = 𝑄𝑟2 and 𝑟2 =
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 ⇔ 𝑞𝑟2 = 𝑄𝑟1) is 𝑄𝑟2 − 𝑞𝑟2 = 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞). 
42 See supra (n 5). 
35 
 
In the same way as the baseline model, there are four possible decisions for 𝑈1 to 
maximize its profit: selling only component 𝐴; selling only 𝐵1; selling both components in 
separate marketing; or bundle 𝐴 and 𝐵1 together 
 
Payoffs:  
𝐷’s profit if it installs 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑖: 𝑉𝐷 =  Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖  
𝐷’s profit if it installs the 𝐴 and 𝐵1 bundle: ?̂?𝐷 =  Π −  ?̂?1 
𝐷’s profit if only 𝐵𝑖 is installed: 𝑉𝐷 =  π − 𝐹𝐵𝑖  
𝐷’s profit if only 𝐴 is installed: 𝑉𝐷 =  Π −  𝐹𝐴 
𝑈1’s profit if 𝐴 and 𝐵1 are installed: 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑄 
𝑈1’s profit if the bundle 𝐴 and 𝐵1 is installed: ?̂?1 = ?̂?1 + 𝑟1𝑄 
𝑈1’s profit if only 𝐵1 is installed: 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑞 − 𝑐 
𝑈1’s profit if only 𝐴 is installed: 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 
𝑈2’s profit if 𝐵2 is installed alongside 𝐴: 𝑉2 = 𝐹𝐵2 + 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 
𝑈2’s profit if 𝐵2 is installed without 𝐴: 𝑉2 = 𝐹𝐵2 + 𝑟2𝑞 − 𝑐 
 
Scenario 1) 𝑼𝟏 only sells 𝑨. 
i) 𝑈1 offers 𝐹𝐴 =  𝛱 − 𝜋 
ii) 𝑈2 offers 𝐹𝐵2 = 0 
iii) Upstream firm’s profits are 𝑉1 =  𝛱 − 𝜋 and 𝑉2 = 𝑄𝑟2 − 𝑐 and downstream firm’s 
profit is 𝑉𝐷 =  𝜋. 
Proof.  i) For 𝐷 to be indifferent between choosing the components 𝐴 and 𝐵2 or only 
installing the component 𝐵2: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵2 ⇔ 𝐹𝐴 ≤  Π − π. Thus, 𝐹𝐴 =  Π −
π is the maximum value that 𝑈1 could demand for 𝐴. ii) Alternatively, in case of 𝐷 being 
indifferent between 𝐴 and 𝐵2 or none: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ 0 ⇔ Π −  Π + 𝜋 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ 0 ⇔
𝐹𝐵2 ≤ 𝜋. Also, for 𝐷 to be indifferent between installing 𝐵2: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 ≥ Π −  𝐹𝐴 ⇔
𝐹𝐵2 ≤ 0. Therefore, as firm 𝑈2 face no competition it does not offer slotting fees, but the 
maximum it can demand for 𝐵2 installation is 𝐹𝐵2 = 0. Any value above, 𝐷 does not install 
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𝐵2. iii) The upstream firm’s profits are 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 and 𝑉2 = 𝐹𝐵2 + 𝑄𝑟2 − 𝑐 and downstream 
firm’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 = Π − 𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 = Π − Π + 𝜋 − 0 = 𝜋.                                                        ∎ 
This scenario is identical to its homologous on the previous model, in terms of 𝑈1’s 
payoff and the logic behind 𝐹𝐴. As expected, 𝑼𝟐’s compatibility cost does not affect 
𝑼𝟏’s profitability of market 𝑨. However, 𝑈2’s profit is smaller due to the cost incurred, 
because its lump-sum payment remains equal to zero. 𝐹𝐵2 = 0 is the maximum value that 𝐷 
accepts to pay for the pre-installation of 𝐵2. Therefore, 𝑈2 cannot charge 𝐹𝐵2 = 𝑐, with the 
objective of transferring the cost to 𝐷, because the downstream firm would reject it and 
would choose to pre-install 𝐴 alone. 
 
Scenario 2.) 𝑼𝟏 only sells 𝑩𝟏 (𝒓𝒊 ≥ 𝒓𝒋). 
i) 𝑈𝑖 offers 𝐹𝐵𝑖 = −𝑟𝑗𝑞 + 𝑐 
ii) 𝑈𝑗 ’s rejected offer is 𝐹𝐵𝑗 = −𝑟𝑗𝑞 + 𝑐 
iii) 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑞(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑗)  and 𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑟1, 𝑟2}𝑞 − 𝑐 
Proof.  i) In order to 𝐷 install 𝐵𝑖 instead of 𝐵𝑗: π − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵𝑗 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝐹𝐵𝑗 . In the 
absence of component 𝐴, the quantity of final products sold it will be 𝑞 and both 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 
incur in compatibility costs. Therefore 𝐹𝐵𝑖 = −𝑟𝑗𝑞 + 𝑐 is accepted, because 𝑈𝑖 still has 
margin for improving its offer by a minimum value which results in a Pareto improvement 
for 𝐷.  ii) 𝐹𝐵𝑗 = −𝑟𝑗𝑞 + 𝑐 because any offer under −𝑟𝑗𝑞 + 𝑐 would make 𝑈𝑗 incur in losses.  
iii) 𝑈𝑖’s profit is 𝑉𝑖 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖𝑞 − 𝑐 = −𝑞𝑟𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑞 = 𝑞(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑗) and 𝐷’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 −
𝐹𝐵𝑖 = 𝜋 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑟1, 𝑟2}𝑞 − 𝑐.                                                                                               ∎ 
The compatibility cost is transferred to the downstream firm independently 
from 𝒓𝒊 ≥ 𝒓𝒋. For 𝑈𝑗 to not incur in losses, it must charge 𝑐 to firm 𝐷 through its slotting 
fee and, since the best maximization profit strategy for 𝑈𝑖 is to 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝐹𝐵𝑗 , the firm 𝑈𝑖 also 
reduces its slotting fee by 𝑐. Therefore, the cost is borne by the downstream firm through 
the reduction of 𝐵𝑖’s slotting fees by 𝑐. 
Correspondingly to the previous model, this scenario is purely hypothetical since 𝑈1’s 
profit is the lowest compared to all other strategies. In addition, the success of 𝑈1 on 
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installing 𝐵1 will depend on the efficiency of the components (𝑟1, 𝑟2). Therefore, in this 
scenario 𝑈1 would be “betting” on its efficiency, incurring in compatibility costs due to 𝐴’s 
absence and tossing away its monopoly profit on the market 𝐴. 
 
Scenario 3.1.) 𝑼𝟏 sells 𝑨 and 𝑩𝟏 in separate marketing (𝒓𝟏 ≥ 𝒓𝟐) 
i) 𝑈1 accepted offer is 𝐹𝐵1 = −𝑟2𝑄 + 𝑐 
ii) 𝑈2’s rejected offer is 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑟2𝑄 + 𝑐 
iii) 𝐹𝐴 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 is accepted 
iv) 𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 + 𝑄(𝑟1 − 𝑟2) + 𝑐 and downstream firm’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 =
𝜋 + 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐43 
Proof  i) There are two situations where 𝐷 is indifferent between installing 𝐵1:  First, in 
order to 𝐷 install 𝐴 and 𝐵1 instead of 𝐴 and 𝐵2: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵1 ≥ Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵1 ≤
𝐹𝐵2 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵1 ≤ −𝑟2𝑄 + 𝑐. Second, for 𝐷 prefers to install 𝐴 and 𝐵1 over component 𝐴 : Π −
 𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵1 ≥ Π − 𝐹𝐴 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵1 ≤ 0. Thus, the offer that 𝑈1 will make for 𝐵1 it is the maximum 
offer of the least efficient firm, 𝐹𝐵1 = −𝑟2𝑄 + 𝑐. This offer is accepted because 𝑈1 still have 
margin for improving its offer and 𝑈2 does not.  ii) 𝑈2 knows that 𝐴 could be installed 
alongside 𝐵2 and incurs in cost 𝑐. Thus, 𝑈2 needs to recoup 𝑐 through the slotting fee, or 
else will incur in losses (𝑉2 = 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 + 𝐹𝐵2). Therefore, 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑟2𝑄 + 𝑐. iii) Assuming 
that 𝐷 wants to install 𝐴 and 𝐵1 instead of only 𝐵2: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵1 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵2 ⇔ 𝐹𝐴 ≤ Π −
π − 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝐹𝐵2 . And, in order to 𝐷 prefers to install 𝐴 and 𝐵1 instead of 𝐵1 alone: Π −  𝐹𝐴 −
𝐹𝐵1 ≥ π − 𝐹𝐵1 ⇔  Π − π ≤ 𝐹𝐴. Then, 𝐹𝐴 = Π − 𝜋 is the best profit maximization offer 
that 𝑈1 could make for 𝐴 to be installed iv) 𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑄 = Π − π +
Q(𝑟1 − 𝑟2) + 𝑐 and 𝑈2’s profit is 𝑉2 = 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 + 𝐹𝐵2 = 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 − 𝑟2𝑄 + 𝑐 = 0. The 
downstream firm’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 = Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖 = 𝜋 − 𝑐 + 𝑟2𝑄.                                             ∎ 
 
 
                                                     
43 I assume that 𝑈2’s total revenue is higher than the compatibility cost 𝑟2𝑄 > 𝑐. Otherwise, there would not 
be any logical explanation for 𝑈2 to belong in the 𝐵𝑖  market. 
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Scenario 3.2.) 𝑼𝟏 sells 𝑨 and 𝑩𝟏 in separate marketing (𝒓𝟏 < 𝒓𝟐). 
i) 𝑈1’s accepted offer is 𝐹𝐵1 = −𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) if 𝑐 > 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) and 𝐹𝐵1 =
−𝑟1𝑄 is rejected if otherwise. 
ii) 𝑈2’s accepted offer is 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑟1𝑄 if 𝑐 ≤ 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) and 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 −
𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) is rejected if otherwise. 
iii) 𝐹𝐴 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 is accepted in both cases. 
iv) If  𝑐 > 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1): 𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 + 𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) and 𝐷’s profit is 
𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 . If 𝑐 ≤ 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1): 𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋, 𝑈2’s profit is 
𝑉2 = 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) − 𝑐 and downstream firm’s profit is 𝑉𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑟1𝑄. 
Proof.  i) In order to 𝐷 install 𝐴 and 𝐵1 instead of 𝐴 and 𝐵2: Π −  𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵1 ≥ Π −  𝐹𝐴 −
𝐹𝐵2 ⇔ 𝐹𝐵1 ≤ 𝐹𝐵2 . Assuming if 𝐹𝐵2 = 𝐹𝐵1 = −𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 it remains a margin for 
improvement of both offers. In asymmetric Bertrand competition the least efficient firm has 
null profits. In this case, both have profits. 𝑉2 = 𝐹𝐵2 − 𝑐 + 𝑄𝑟2 = 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) and 𝑉𝐵1 = 𝑐. 
Thus, it is observable that 𝑈1 could increase its slotting fee by 𝑐 and 𝑈2 could increase its 
slotting fee by 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1). Nevertheless, it is unknown if the compatibility cost incurred by 
𝑈2 is superior to the difference between 𝐵𝑖 and 𝐵𝑗 revenues. Thus, it surges two cases: First, 
if  𝑐 > 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1), 𝑈1 offers 𝐹𝐵1 = −𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) and 𝐷 accepts it because 𝑈1 
still have margin for improvement of its offer which is equal to 𝑈2’s maximum slotting fee 
𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1). ii) Second, if 𝑐 ≤ 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1), 𝑈2 offers 𝐹𝐵2 = −𝑟1𝑄 and it 
is accepted by 𝐷, since 𝑈1 only could offer 𝐹𝐵1 = −𝑟1𝑄 and any value above will incur in 
losses for selling 𝐵1.  iii) Same logic explanation of Scenario 3.1.  iv) If  𝑐 > 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1), 
𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑄 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) + 𝑟1𝑄 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 +
𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1), 𝑈2’s profit is 𝑉2 = 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 + 𝐹𝐵2 = 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 − 𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) =
0 and 𝑉𝐷 = 𝛱 − 𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵1 = 𝛱 − 𝛱 + 𝜋 + 𝑟1𝑄 − 𝑐 + 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑟1𝑄 = 𝜋 + 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐. If 𝑐 ≤
𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1), 𝑈1’s profit is 𝑉1 = 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐵1 + 𝑟1𝑄 =  𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑟1𝑄 = 𝛱 − 𝜋, 𝑈2’s 
profit is 𝑉2 = 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 + 𝐹𝐵2 = 𝑟2𝑄 − 𝑐 − 𝑟1𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) − 𝑐 and downstream firm’s 
profit is 𝑉𝐷 = 𝛱 − 𝐹𝐴 − 𝐹𝐵2 = 𝛱 − 𝛱 + 𝜋 + 𝑟1𝑄 = 𝜋 + 𝑟1𝑄.                                                ∎ 
𝑼𝟏 takes advantage of 𝑼𝟐’s compatibility cost to reduce its slotting fee and 
improving its profits in the same amount. Consequently, the cost is borne by the 
downstream firm again through the reduction of 𝐵𝑖’s slotting fees by 𝑐 when 𝑟1 ≥ 𝑟2 and by 
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𝑐 − 𝑞(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) when 𝑟1 < 𝑟2 and 𝑐 > 𝑞(𝑟2 − 𝑟1). The cost is only loaded by an upstream 
firm when 𝑐 ≤ 𝑞(𝑟2 − 𝑟1), making 𝑈2’s profit 𝑉2 = 𝑞(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) − 𝑐. In Scenarios 3.1 and 
3.2, 𝑈1 faces no compatibility cost as a result of the synergy caused by 𝐵1 being pre-installed 
in conjunction with component 𝐴. 
Figure 5 – Installed components under separate marketing with compatibility costs 
 
Similarly to the original model, selling both components is the most profitable 
strategy for 𝑈1 as an alternative to bundling. Although, in this model it remains the more 
profitable option independently from 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑗, if 𝑐 > 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1). Therefore, the downstream 
firm’s indifference curve has moved to the left by 𝑐 𝑄⁄ .44 Meaning, that in separate marketing, 
even when 𝑼𝟐 has a more efficient component (𝒓𝟏 < 𝒓𝟐), it does not guarantee the 
pre-installation of the 𝑩𝟐. Nevertheless, equally to the original model, 𝑈1 cannot capture 
the global value of component 𝐴 in separate marketing. 
 
Scenario 4) 𝑼𝟏 bundles 𝑨 and 𝑩𝟏 
iv) Firm 𝑈1 offers  ?̂?1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 + ?̂?𝐵2 
                                                     
44 𝑐 = 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) ⇔ 𝑟2 = 𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑄
. 
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v) Firm 𝑈2 offers ?̂?𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑐 
vi) Downstream firm’s profit is ?̂?𝐷 = 𝜋 + 𝑞𝑟2 − 𝑐. Firm 𝑈1’s profit is ?̂?1 = 𝛱 − 𝜋 −
𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 
Proof.  i) The downstream firm accepts the bundle instead of only installing component 𝐵2 
if: ?̂?𝐷 ≥ 𝑉𝐷 ⇔ Π − F̂1 ≥ π − F̂B2 ⇔ F̂1 ≤ Π − π + F̂B2 . Therefore, F̂1 = Π − π + F̂B2 
because it is the maximum value which 𝑈1 could demand to make 𝐷 indifferent between 
installing the two options. ii) 𝑈2 anticipates that on a bundling scenario 𝐵2 cannot be 
installed alongside 𝐴 and will incur with 𝑐. Thus, ?̂?𝐵2 = −𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑐 is the best offer that 𝑈2 
could afford, without incurring in any losses. iii) Upstream firm’s profit is ?̂?1 = ?̂?1 + 𝑟1𝑄 =
𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑐 + 𝑟1𝑄 and downstream firm’s profit is ?̂?𝐷 = Π − ?̂?1.                                   ∎ 
Bundling is the best profit maximization strategy for 𝑈1 since it can capture the 
indirect (𝑄 − 𝑞) and direct value (𝛱 − 𝜋) of component 𝐴 installation. Furthermore, since 
𝐵2 cannot be installed alongside 𝐴, bundling reduces 𝑈2’s willingness to pay slotting fees. 
When we compare this bundling profit to its homologous in the original model, bundling 
reveals to be even more profitable in presence of compatibility costs, because the cost 
is transferred to the downstream firm through the reduction of upstream firm’s slotting fees 
by 𝑐, similarly to the previous scenario. Although, when the bundling profit is compared to 
the profit of selling 𝐴 and 𝐵1 in separate marketing, 𝑼𝟏 presents the same profit increase 
of 𝒓𝟐(𝑸 − 𝒒), exactly as the original model, regardless of 𝒓𝒊 ≥ 𝒓𝒋 
45. Therefore, having 
or not having synergies in the joint pre-installation of the components, bundling causes the 
same profit increase when compared to separate marketing. 
How 𝒓𝟏 and 𝒓𝟐 impact the optimal decision of 𝑼𝟏 to bundling? Likewise to the 
timing modification model, when 𝑟1 ≥ 𝑟2 bundling is the most profitable strategy for 𝑈1 
(?̂?1 > 𝑉1𝐴+𝐵1 > 𝑉1𝐴 > 𝑉1𝐵1). Hence, it is important to know what is the best strategy for 𝑈1 
when 𝑟1 < 𝑟2.  
When 𝑟1 < 𝑟2, 𝑈1 chooses between its two most profitable options: bundling or 
selling only 𝐴. I only consider when 𝑐 ≤ 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) because otherwise, bundle is always 
                                                     
45 ?̂?1 − 𝑉1𝐴+𝐵1 =
(𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑐 + 𝑟1𝑄) − [𝛱 − 𝜋 + 𝑐 − 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1)] = 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞).  
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optimal, independently from 𝑟1 < 𝑟2.
46 Therefore, 𝑈1 bundles when: ?̂?1 ≥ 𝑉1𝐴 ⇔ Π − π −
𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 ≥ Π − π ⇔ 𝑟1𝑄 − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑐 ≥ 0 ⇔ 𝑟1
𝑄
𝑞
+
𝑐
𝑞
≤ 𝑟2 
Figure 6 – Installed components and optimal bundling decision with compatibility costs 
 
Equally to Scenario 4 of the previous model, the blue line from Figure 6 characterises 
the downstream firm’s indifference between pre-installing the bundle or pre-installing only 
𝐵2. It also represents the limit of the optimality of 𝑈1’s bundling decision. Therefore, 
according to the proof and the graph, the most profitable strategy for 𝑈1 is to bundle if 𝑟2 ≤
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑞
 and 𝐷 pre-installs it. And when 𝑟2 >
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑞
 the optimal strategy for 𝑈1 is to sell 
only component 𝐴 and the downstream firm installs 𝐴 and 𝐵2 through separate marketing 
The Figure 6 confirms that when 𝑈1 bundles, it hampers the chances of 𝐵2 pre-
installation. In order to 𝐵2 to be pre-installed, the 𝑈2’s direct revenue (or efficiency) greater 
than 𝑟1𝑄 is a necessary condition but no longer sufficient. The 𝑞𝑟2 must be also greater than 
the capacity cost incurred, 𝑞𝑟2 > 𝑄𝑟1 + 𝑐. Thus, bundling produces anticompetitive 
effects, because in separate marketing 𝑈2 only need to ensure that 𝑄𝑟2 > 𝑄𝑟1 + 𝑐. In other 
                                                     
46 If 𝑐 > 𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1)  𝑈1 would decide between its two most profitable strategies: Bundling or selling 𝐴 and 𝐵1 
in separate marketing and opts for the first as: ?̂?1 ≥ 𝑉1𝐴+𝐵1 ⇔ 𝛱 − 𝜋 − 𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑟1𝑄 + 𝑐 ≥ 𝛱 − 𝜋 + 𝑐 −
𝑄(𝑟2 − 𝑟1) ⇔ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑄. 
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words, when 𝑈1 bundles, the efficiency of 𝐵2 must be greater than the efficiency of 𝐵1 by 
the proportion of the increase in sales that component 𝐴 causes when installed (𝑄/𝑞) plus 
the cost incurred.  
The grey area of Figure 6 embodies the anticompetitive effect of bundling, which is 
caused by the increase of slope of 𝐷’s indifference curve from 𝑟2 = 𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑄
 to 𝑟2 = 𝑟1
𝑄
𝑞
+
𝑐
𝑞
. 
More specifically, in separate marketing 𝐷 was indifferent between installing 𝐵1 or 𝐵2 if 𝑟2 =
𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑄
. However, when 𝑈1 practices bundling, the component 𝐵1 becomes more attractive 
to 𝐷, because installing 𝐵2 implies not installing 𝐴. Therefore, when faced with the bundle 
option, the downstream firm only becomes indifferent between pre-installing 𝐵1 or 𝐵2 if 
𝑟2 = 𝑟1
𝑄
𝑞
+
𝑐
𝑞
.  
Therefore, the anticompetitive effect (grey area) is quantified by 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞) which is 
the difference between the two 𝐷’ indifference curves.47 This value also represents 𝑈1’s profit 
increase and 𝑈2’s profit decrease due to bundling. Therefore, bundling presents the same 
anticompetitive effect 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞), independently from the compatibility costs, and 𝑈1 
continues to successfully leverage its dominance in market 𝐴 to increase its profits in market 
𝐵𝑖 in the same way. 
Although, when compared to Scenario 4 of the previous model, the area of optimality 
of bundling (or the conditions where 𝐷 choose to pre-install the bundle) is greater in the 
presence of 𝑈2’s compatibility costs by 
𝑐
𝑄
 48. Meaning that 𝑈2 has more difficulties to install 
𝐵2 in this model. Nevertheless, 𝑈2 has the same increase of difficulty by 
𝑐
𝑄
 on Separate 
marketing (Scenario 3) in comparison to Scenario 3 of the original model. The value 
represents the shift of the 𝐷’s indifference curve to the left by 
𝑐
𝑄
 caused by the compatibility 
costs, as shown in Figure 5. Thus, the bundle with synergies from this model does not have 
higher anticompetitive effects than the bundle without compatibility costs.  
                                                     
47 The difference between the two curves (𝑟2 = 𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑄
⇔ 𝑄𝑟1 = 𝑄𝑟2 − 𝑐 and 𝑟2 =
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑞
⇔ 𝑄𝑟1 = 𝑞𝑟2 −
𝑐) is (𝑄𝑟2 − 𝑐) − (𝑞𝑟2 + 𝑐) = 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞). 
48 The difference between the two blue curves of Scenario 4 between the two models (𝑟2 =
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 +
𝑐
𝑞
⇔ 𝑟1 =
𝑞
𝑄
𝑟2 −
𝑐
𝑄
 and 𝑟2 =
𝑄
𝑞
𝑟1 ⇔ 𝑟1 =
𝑞
𝑄
𝑟2) is 
𝑞
𝑄
𝑟2 +
𝑐
𝑄
−
𝑞
𝑄
𝑟1 =
𝑐
𝑄
. 
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6. Discussion 
6.1. The anticompetitive effect of bundling 
As the results demonstrate, bundling harms competition and impede 𝑈2 from competing 
on its merits, since its efficiency’s superiority is no longer the deciding factor for component 
𝐵2 to be installed. This disadvantage caused by bunding is represented by the grey area on 
graphs from Figures 4 and 6. The effect of bundling on the competition is not a novel result. 
In fact, it is the most common one. Several notable authors like as Nalebuff (2004), Whinston 
(1990), Carlton and Waldman (2002) and J. P. Choi and Stefanadis (2001) reached the same 
conclusion. Although, on this dissertation, contrary to the previously cited articles, the 
objective of bundling is not to deter entrance nor it relies on two-period negotiations, but it 
has the same competition effects. The monopoly joint-control of two products give few 
opportunities for the rival firm to compete. 
When compared to the original model, the profitability of bundling is higher when 𝑈1 
has synergies. This result is due to the increased 𝑈2’s difficulty to install 𝐵2 when incurring 
in compatibility costs and since the downstream firm borne the cost through the reduction 
of upstream firms’ slotting fees in the same amount. This result may indicate that cost 
advantages and synergies in the joint installation of the components may be an extra incentive 
for the monopolist firm to bundle, since it allows the company to practice a lower price for 
the bundle without decreasing its profits proportionally. This logic reasoning is comparable 
to when the monopolist firm bundles and has economies of scope (Kühn et al., 2005) or 
when rivals incur in entry costs (Carlton & Waldman, 2002). 
 However, the result that most intrigue us in the modified model with compatibility costs 
is that the bundle harms 𝑈2 and 𝐷 exactly by the same amount as in the original model. In a 
first instance, it would be expected that, since the 𝑈2 firm incurs with compatibility costs, 
the bundling would not be as damaging or, perhaps detrimental, like when 𝑈2 does not incur 
in costs. Because in the latter situation 𝑈2 has higher profits and 𝐵2 is exactly equal to 𝐵1 in 
separate marketing. Hence, it would be expected that 𝑈2 had more to lose when 𝑈1 bundles 
in the original model.  
Nevertheless, since the anticompetitive effects are exactly 𝑟2(𝑄 − 𝑞) regardless of the 
synergy, the rationale of bundling for efficiency reasons may not be a valid argument to 
antitrust authorities for permitting the presence of pure bundling strategies (i.e. for 
44 
 
exempting Article 101(1)), because it infringes Article 101(3b) by detriment competition. 
This economic argument is also corroborated by Kühn et al. (2005). Indeed, pure bundling 
has anticompetitive effects and the synergies are not solely dependent on the bundling, as 
the results confirm when 𝐴 and 𝐵1 are sold separately the 𝐵1 compatibility cost also 
extinguishes. Thus, besides the 𝑈1’s efficiencies, bundling may have an exclusion rationale 
with the objective of leveraging market power, similarly to J. Choi and Jeon (2018) and 
Whinston (1990) results. Furthermore, it infringes Article 101(3a) because the bundle is not 
strictly necessary to the execution of the objectives. 
6.2. Bundling and investment in innovation 
In separate marketing and without compatibility costs, 𝑈2 only need to ensure that 𝐵2’s 
efficiency is superior to 𝐵1 to be pre-installed. Nonetheless, when 𝑈1 bundles, the previous 
condition is no longer sufficient. Therefore, when 𝑈2 competes against the bundle, the firm 
has to invest even more in innovation in order to make 𝐵2 even more efficient compared to 
𝐵1. Furthermore, if 𝑈1 have synergies in selling both components, it is even harder for 𝐵2 
to be installed because its efficiency must also overcome the compatibility costs. Hence, 
likewise to J. P. Choi and Stefanadis (2001), bundling may discourage the decision of 
investment in innovation of 𝐵1’s rivals and, according to Etro and Caffarra (2017), for the 
monopolist firm either, since it does not need to produce a more efficient component than 
its rival in order to have it pre-installed.  
6.3. Timing modification 
In a first perspective, the feature of 𝑈2 deciding its slotting fee second, after observing 
the slotting fee offered by 𝑈1, it could be considered an advantage for 𝑈2, since the firm will 
have more information to make its decision and thereby, offer its slotting fee at a value more 
suitable to win the competition for the installation of 𝐵2. However, the results did not show 
any changes compared to the model with the original timing of Cornière and Taylor (2018). 
Meaning, that the timing of 𝑈2 decision does not affect the outcome of the upstream and 
downstream firms in a bundling setup nor in separate marketing. The assumption of 
complete information, where firms know and anticipate rival’s slotting fees and payoffs, 
allows firm 𝑈2 to decide simultaneously with the same information as if it decided 
subsequently after 𝑈1 with perfect information. Also, with complete information, when in 
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𝑡 = 0 𝑈1 announces its strategy, gives the necessary info for 𝑈2’s decision. Therefore, 𝑈2 
does not have any informational advantage by deciding after 𝑈1. 
6.4. Choice of the model 
The wide-ranging literature on tying can be applied directly to analyse the Android case. 
I examined different models and related literature which could help explain the case and  
opted for the baseline model of homogenous consumers from Cornière and Taylor (2018). 
The model constitutes a decent representation of the vertical dimension of the smartphone 
applications market compared to other similar models. 
Conferring to Whinston (1990) and Carlton and Waldman (2012), the authors do not 
approach the nature of the two-sided markets. This feature is important to include in the 
model, because the investigation concerns about the search engine and application store 
market, which are considered two-sided. Furthermore, their models do not include the 
possibility of the tying firm selling its tying product (Google Play) for free to final consumers. 
As the last differentiating factor, Whinston (1990) focus on entry deterrence rather than rival 
exclusion and does not consider negative prices. Although, Google gives financial incentives 
and slotting fees for its apps to be installed (RSA). Thus, it is necessary the inclusion of the 
possibility of negative prices in the model.  
In the application store and search engine’s markets, the price charged to final consumers 
is often null and suffers little or no variation. Then, it is improbable for a firm to increase 
the demand for the product by altering its price, as price externalities are rare. Thus, the 
increase of profit does not happen through vertical integration or joint-control which allows 
the firm to increase demand by reducing prices (Kühn et al., 2005). In the Cornière and 
Taylor (2018) model, the downstream firm’s profit increase is achieved by lump-sum 
transfers from upstream firms to the downstream firm which produce no price externalities 
on the finished product.  
Ide and Montero (2016) have a similar model to Cornière and Taylor (2018), but they 
assume that the upstream firms could sell its products directly to the final consumer, and this 
feature does not happen in the Google Android case. Although, Ide and Montero (2016) 
have a different key aspect for the explanation of the extension of the monopoly’s market 
power to an adjacent market through bundling, the high level of downstream competition 
and the heterogeneity of the population. The importance of downstream competition would 
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also approximate the model to the reality of the case. Cornière and Taylor (2018) also 
suggested this aspect for further investigation, but since Ide and Montero (2016) already 
cover that feature I decided to introduce compatibility costs. 
The recent article of J. Choi and Jeon (2018), also motivated by the Google-Android 
antitrust case, provides an innovative way to examine tying in two-sided markets. The authors 
highlighted the importance of non-negative price constraints on the profitability of tying and 
leveraging market power. The Cornière and Taylor (2018) model differentiates from J. Choi 
and Jeon (2018) because of the inexistence of the non-negative price constraint. Although in 
both papers, bundling relaxes competition. In Cornière and Taylor (2018) it happens because 
of the decrease of 𝑈2’s willingness to pay slotting fees, as a result of the assumption of retail 
complementarity. In J. Choi and Jeon (2018) the competition is relaxed due to the non-
negative price constraint - The monopoly's rival cannot practice negative prices. Thus, it 
cannot compete with the tied product which is being sold at a zero or a negative price. 
6.5. Slotting fees  
In Bertrand competition, price competition is so intense that two firms achieve the 
perfectly competitive outcome. In this model, since one firm has some form of cost 
advantage in selling its component, we move to an asymmetric Bertrand competition (Boone, 
Larraín Aylwin, Müller, & Ray Chaudhuri, 2012). The slotting fee appears as a result of fierce 
price competition. The upstream firms offer lower prices subsequently until the price 
becomes negative, because there are no marginal costs. Then, firms can recoup the negative 
price on the consumer side of the market (their direct in-app revenue). Consequently, the 
negotiations end when the least efficient firm offers its best price and has null profits. 
In this model, the provision of free components aims to extend the dominance of the 
tying component to the tied component market. On two-sided platforms like Google’s 
applications (consumers and advertisers), this is a common practice: a platform operator 
provides a service to users without directly charge it, and chooses to profit from fees charged 
by third parties (R. H. Bork & Sidak, 2012; Geradin & Edelman, 2016). Those third parties 
are application developers and advertisers. The revenues from advertising plus a fixed 
percentage of app developers’ revenues are represented in the model by 𝑟1. 
Similarly to the model of Etro and Caffarra (2017), the offering of slotting fees to the 
downstream firm for the bundle to be installed, provides a rationale for the financial 
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incentives that are currently attributed by Google to OEMs for exclusivity, the RSAs.  
However, this dissertation interprets the slotting fees not for exclusivity reasons, because 
exclusion is already achieved through the MADAs, that is, through the contractual bundling.  
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7. Conclusions 
The present dissertation contributes to the analysis of the consequences of bundling on 
the vertical chain competition segment in a scenario in which compatibility costs and 
synergies are present. Furthermore, it is provided a brief overview of the European 
Competition Law in order to understand the infringements and the legal framework of 
Google’s tying practices. In addition, this study may provide additional information to the 
antitrust policy, on a theoretical perspective, on how the anticompetitive effects are altered 
according to the cost structure of the companies. 
The model with compatibility costs incorporate the specificities of the alleged efficiencies 
that Google claims to have when its applications are installed together and demonstrates the 
incompatibilities that their rivals face when their apps are pre-installed instead of the Google 
Mobile Services applications. At a first impression, this bundling justification for efficiency 
reasons appears to produce less anticompetitive effects than in the absence of synergies, 
since rivals already have a component that is less desirable for the downstream firm (lower 
slotting fees) in separate marketing, so bundling would not “steal” a substantial rival’s profit.  
Nevertheless, our results show that bundling displays equal anticompetitive effects, 
regardless of the synergies or compatibility costs. Therefore, this efficiency justification of 
bundling does not seem to be a strong argument in favour of competition authorities for 
permitting this practice, since the anticompetitive effects are the same. The model reveals 
that bundling has the sole purpose of capturing the global value of component 𝐴 and its 
synergies only make bundling even more profitable, because the compatibility costs makes 
even more difficult for rivals to pre-install its components. This increased rival’s difficulty 
prevents it from competing on its merits and may demand an extra investment in innovation 
to create a superior component. Therefore, bundling may diminish incentives in innovating 
because the monopolist does not need to have a more efficient component in order to be 
pre-installed.  
This dissertation also demonstrate that bundling allows profitable leveraging of market 
power and shows how the downstream firm is harmed by bundling. That is, when the 
monopolist bundles, it decreases rival’s willingness to pay slotting fees. As consequence, the 
downstream firm’s profit is smaller compared to its profit in separate marketing. 
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7.1. Further research suggestions 
Since the European antitrust policy focus more on the consumer’s welfare than 
anticompetitive effects (Tirole, 2005), the model with compatibility costs presents some 
limitations on the assessment of how consumers are affected by this synergy. It is important 
to assess, for example, if consumers are better served with the free pre-installed bundle, or 
with a free choice of pre-installed apps, but with the possibility of being charged for having 
the Android OS. And, taking into account consumer’s preferences and utility for the 
applications pre-installed. 
In EU Competition Law standpoint, more specifically, accordingly to the Article 101(3) 
TFEU, even if consumers are better served with the bundle and the latter produce 
efficiencies, the bundle should not be allowed if it eliminates a substantial part of the 
competition (Article 101(3b)) and if imposes restrictions that are dispensable for the 
objectives (Article 101(3a)). In Google’s appeal, the firm claims to have credible rivals in the 
operating system market and the bundle is necessary to offer the Android OS for free. 
Therefore, even if Google’s allegations do not represent the reality, the assessment of how 
consumers are affected by this bundling reveals to be an important issue to explore. For 
instance, is mandatory unbundling an optimal antitrust policy if implies superior prices and 
a possible reduction of technological progress, leaving consumers worse-off? In summary, 
investigating these previous questions would be important to the literature of tying and 
European Competition policy. This research avenue may provide additional insights of the 
effects of bundling and mandatory unbundling on the consumer side of the market of the 
Google-Android case. And, it may clarify and redefine this competition policy trade-off 
between consumer’s welfare and technological progress with the objective of ensuring 
competition from Article 101(3b). 
The timing modification produced the same results of Cornière and Taylor (2018). 
Although, additional interpretations for the results were provided. Like the analysis of how 
component’s efficiency alters the optimal decision of bundling. The assumption of complete 
information permits rivals to decide simultaneously with the same information as if they 
decided after the monopolist with perfect information. Therefore, as another possible 
expansion of this dissertation could be considering incomplete information in the 
negotiation process. It may be interesting to study how this modification could affect 
downstream firm’s revenue, and whether bundling would continue to be optimal for the 
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monopolist since the latter would not know the downstream firm’s preference between 
installing the bundle or the rival component.  
51 
 
References 
Adams, W. J., & Yellen, J. L. (1976). Commodity Bundling And Burden Of Monopoly. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 90(3), 475-498. doi:10.2307/1886045 
Amelio, A., & Jullien, B. (2012). Tying and freebies in two-sided markets. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 30(5), 436-446. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.03.002 
Armstrong, M. (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. Rand Journal of Economics, 37(3), 668-691. 
doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x 
Bakos, Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. (1999). Bundling information goods: Pricing, profits, and efficiency. 
Management Science, 45(12), 1613-1630. doi:10.1287/mnsc.45.12.1613 
Boone, J., Larraín Aylwin, M. J., Müller, W., & Ray Chaudhuri, A. (2012). Bertrand competition with 
asymmetric costs: Experimental evidence. Economics Letters, 117(1), 134-137. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.098 
Bork, R. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox (F. P. 1993 Ed.). 
Bork, R. H., & Sidak, J. G. (2012). What Does The Chicago School Teach Aabout Internet Search 
and the Antitrust Treatment of Google? Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 8(4), 663-700. 
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhs031 
Bowers, L. T. (1980). The antitrust paradox - a policy at war with itself - Bork,RH. American Business 
Law Journal, 18(1), 107-111. doi:10.1111/j.1744-1714.1980.tb00028.x 
Bowman, W. S. (1957). Tying arrangements and the leverage problem. Yale Law Journal, 67(1), 19-36. 
doi:10.2307/793947 
Carbajo, J., Demeza, D., & Seidmann, D. J. (1990). A strategic motivation for commodity bundling. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 38(3), 283-298. doi:10.2307/2098499 
Carlton, D. W., Gans, J. S., & Waldman, M. (2010). Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use? 
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics, 2(3), 85-105. doi:10.1257/mic.2.3.85 
Carlton, D. W., & Waldman, M. (2002). The strategic use of tying to preserve and create market 
power in evolving industries. Rand Journal of Economics, 33(2), 194-220. doi:10.2307/3087430 
Carlton, D. W., & Waldman, M. (2012). Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of 
Tying. Economic Journal, 122(561), 675-706. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02481.x 
Carlton, D. W., & Waldman, M. (2014). Robert Bork's Contributions to Antitrust Perspectives on 
Tying Behavior. Journal of Law & Economics, 57, S121-S144. doi:10.1086/675861 
Chappatte, P., & Boyce, J. (2018). An Overview of the EU Competition Rules. 
https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2536650/an-overview-of-the-eu-competition-
rules.pdf 
Chen, Y. M., & Riordan, M. H. (2013). Profitability of Product Bundling. International Economic Review, 
54(1), 35-57. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00725.x 
52 
 
Choi, J., & Jeon, D.-S. (2018). A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets. Retrieved from 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:30704 
Choi, J. P., Jullien, B., & Lefouili, Y. (2017). Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing: 
Corrigendum and Comment. Journal of Industrial Economics, 65(4), 872-886. 
doi:10.1111/joie.12156 
Choi, J. P., & Stefanadis, C. (2001). Tying, investment, and the dynamic leverage theory. Rand Journal 
of Economics, 32(1), 52-71. doi:10.2307/2696397 
Cornière, A., & Taylor, G. (2018). Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power. C.E.P.R. Discussion 
Papers.  Retrieved from https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13083 
Correia-da-Silva, J., Jullien, B., Lefouili, Y., & Pinho, J. (2019). Horizontal mergers between 
multisided platforms: Insights from Cournot competition. Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, 28(1), 109-124. doi:10.1111/jems.12309 
Dana, J. D., & Spier, K. E. (2015). Do tying, bundling, and other purchase restraints increase product 
quality? International Journal of Industrial Organization, 43, 142-147. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.005 
Director, A., & Levi, E. H. (1956). LAW AND THE FUTURE - TRADE REGULATION. 
Northwestern University Law Review, 51(2), 281-296.  
Edelman, B. (2015). Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying And Bundling? Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics, 11(2), 365-400. doi:10.1093/joclec/nhv016 
Etro, F., & Caffarra, C. (2017). On the economics of the Android case. European Competition Journal, 
13(2-3), 282-313. doi:10.1080/17441056.2017.1386957 
European Commission. (2005). DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty 
to exclusionary abuses. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf 
European Commission. (2011). Proceedings for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU: Key actors and 
checks and balances. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/key_actors_en.pdf 
European Commission. (2012). Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
Official Journal of the European Union: European Union Retrieved from https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:TOC. 
European Commission. (2013a). EU Competition Law - Rules Applicable to Antitrust Enforcement. 
Volume I: General Rules, 282. doi:10.2763/35312 
European Commission. (2013b). EU Competition Law - Rules Applicable to Antitrust Enforcement. 
Volume II: General Block Exemption Regulations and Guidelines, 281. doi:10.2763/35481 
Farrell, J., & Katz, M. L. (2000). Innovation, rent extraction, and integration in systems markets. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 48(4), 413-432.  
53 
 
Gans, J. S. (2011). Remedies for tying in computer applications. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 29(5), 505-512. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.12.002 
Gayer, A., & Shy, O. (2016). A welfare evaluation of tying strategies. Research in Economics, 70(4), 623-
637. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2016.08.003 
Geradin, D., & Edelman, B. (2016). Android and Competition Law: Exploring and Assessing 
Google's Practices in Mobile. European Competition Journal 12, 159-194. 
doi:10.1080/17441056.2016.1254483 
Gilbert, R. J., & Riordan, M. H. (2007). Product improvement and technological tying in a winner-
take-all market. Journal of Industrial Economics, 55(1), 113-139. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6451.2007.00305.x 
Google. (2018). Economic Impact Report. Retrieved from https://economicimpact.google.com/ 
Graf, T. (2004). Analysis of Tying Under Article 82 EC: The European Commission's Microsoft 
Decision in Perspective. World Competition, 225-244.  
Greenlee, P., Reitman, D., & Sibley, D. S. (2008). An antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(5), 1132-1152. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.11.001 
Holzweber, S. (2018). Tying and bundling in the digital era. European Competition Journal, 14(2-3), 342-
366. doi:10.1080/17441056.2018.1533360 
Ide, E., & Montero, J.-P. (2016). Bundled Discounts and Monopolization in Wholesale Markets. Working 
Paper.   
Jeon, D. S., & Menicucci, D. (2012). Bundling and Competition for Slots. American Economic Review, 
102(5), 1957-1985. doi:10.1257/aer.102.5.1957 
Kühn, K.-U., Stillman, R., & Caffarra, C. (2005). Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy 
Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case. European 
Competition Journal, 1(1), 85-121. doi:10.5235/ecj.v1n1.85 
Matutes, C., & Regibeau, P. (1992). Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a 
Duopoly. Journal of Industrial Economics, 40(1), 37-54. doi:10.2307/2950626 
McAfee, R. P., McMillan, J., & Whinston, M. D. (1989). Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity 
Bundling, And Correlation of Values. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2), 371-383. 
doi:10.2307/2937852 
Nalebuff, B. (2004). Bundling as an entry barrier. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 159-187. 
doi:10.1162/003355304772839551 
Posner, R. A. (1976). Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Vol. 8). The Bell Journal of Economics: 
RAND Corporation. 
Rochet, J. C., & Tirole, J. (2003). Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 1(4), 44. doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 
54 
 
Salinger, M. A. (1995). A Graphical Analysis Of Bundling. Journal of Business, 68(1), 85-98. 
doi:10.1086/296654 
Schmalensee, R. (1982). Commodity Bundling By Single-product Monopolies. Journal of Law & 
Economics, 25(1), 67-71. doi:10.1086/467007 
Sidak, J. G. (2015). Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers? San Diego Law Review, 52, 619-694.  
Tirole, J. (2005). The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer. Competition Policy International, 1(1), 1-25.  
Whinston, M. D. (1990). Tying, Foreclosure, And Exclusion. American Economic Review, 80(4), 837-
859.  
Whinston, M. D. (2001). Exclusivity and tying in US v. Microsoft: What we know, and don't know. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 63-80. doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.63 
 
